Showing posts with label Saudi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saudi. Show all posts

18 May 2008

Academic flogged for sipping coffee with woman

Saudi prof faces flogging for having coffee with woman

Muhammad Ali Abu Raziza, a psychology lecturer at the university of Mecca, has been sentenced to 150 lashes and eight months in jail after the religious police caught him with a woman in a coffee shop...

15 May 2008

Anthropologist suggests removing sword from Saudi flag

Saudi Anthropologist Sa'd Al-Sowayan Advocates Modern Interpretation of Religious Texts, Suggests Swords Be Removed from Saudi Flag

My problem is that the sword is combined with the phrase 'There is no god but Allah. When I wrote this, there were certain circumstances - it was when Al-Zarqawi and his people were decapitating hostages with a sword. It was as if the sword had become one of the symbols of Islam. When you combine the sword with the phrase 'There is no god but Allah,' some people might get confused, and think that you want to spread 'there is no god but Allah' by means of the sword.

28 April 2008

Saudi funding for top Australian University

Top university 'begged' for Saudi funding

A prominent Australian university practically begged the Saudi Arabian embassy to bankroll its Islamic campus for $1.3m, even telling the ambassador it could keep secret elements of the controversial deal.

Documents obtained by The Australian reveal that Griffith University - described by vice-chancellor Ian O'Connor as the "university of choice" for Saudis - offered the embassy an opportunity to reshape the Griffith Islamic Research Unit during its campaign to get some "extra noughts" added to Saudi cheques.
...
The Australian revealed last September that the Muslim community feared Griffith's $100,000 Saudi grant would skew the university's research and create sympathy for an extremist Islamic ideology - Wahabbism - which is espoused by al-Qaeda.
For me, the highlight of this news story isn't that the Saud clan donated money to an academic institution- for they have been doing that for decades in the United States- but that Muslims themselves are becoming more aware of what follows the money.

I think this is a significant development.

31 October 2007

Oil money exports hardline ideology

Malise Ruthven: How the Saudis used oil money to export a hardline ideology that fuels Islamist terror

Since the 1970s, when rising oil revenues enabled the Saudis to export the Wahhabi brand of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia has been a major exporter of ideas and values that differ from those espoused by Osama bin Laden and his followers on issues of strategy, but not on the broader perspectives.

During its years of rivalry with Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, the Saudi government nurtured leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood which President Nasser had forced underground after an attempt on his life in 1954. Those exiled from Egypt included Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb – the Brotherhood's leading intellectual. His writings have helped to inspire a wave of terror attacks, from the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 to the more recent attacks on New York, Madrid and London.

21 October 2007

Calls to shut Saudi-sponsored school

Washington: US State Department Urged to Shut Saudi School in Fairfax

A federal panel yesterday urged the State Department to shut down a Saudi government-supported private school in Northern Virginia unless it can prove it is not teaching religious intolerance.

In a report released yesterday, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom criticized what it called the promotion of religious extremism in Saudi-run schools around the world, including in the kingdom. It leveled particular criticism at the Islamic Saudi Academy, which operates two campuses in Fairfax County, expressing "significant concerns" that the school is promoting a brand of religious intolerance that could prove a danger to the United States.
I find it interesting that when the government panel began their accusations that the school promoted a "radical" curriculum, the school's principal had this to say:
I think they went to Saudi Arabia and saw some curriculum there and thought we are teaching the same curriculum...
There is virtually no attempt to deny that "radical" textbooks do indeed exist in the heartland whose official religion the same article goes on to describe as "...a rigid strain of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism".

16 September 2007

Saudi gift to Australian university

Muslims attack $1m Saudi gift to Australian university

UP to $1 million will be pumped by Saudi Arabia into an Australian university, sparking fears the money will skew its research and create sympathy for an extremist Muslim ideology espoused by al-Qai'da.

Muslim leaders and academics have attacked Queensland's Griffith University for accepting an initial $100,000 grant from the Saudi embassy, which they accused of having given cash in the past to educational institutions to improve the perception of Wahhabism - a hardline interpretation of Islam.

The Australian understands the Griffith Islamic Research Unit will in coming years receive up to $1 million from Saudi Arabia, which has injected more than $120 million into Australia's Islamic community since the 1970s for mosques, schools, scholarships and clerical salaries.

A former member of John Howard's Muslim reference board, Mustapha Kara-Ali, accused the Saudis of using their financial power to transform the landscape of Australia's Islamic community and silence criticism of Wahhabism. "They want to silence criticism of the Wahhabi establishment and its link to global terrorism and national security issues," he said.
Saudi largesse always comes with theological string attached. We have seen how effective peddaling doctrine alongside money is in Iraq (Money, martyrs and mongers) and Afghanistan (Who are the Taliban?).

01 May 2007

Why we remain but don't wear rags on our heads

One should not live under the impression that American designs on Iraq are entirely benign. Their stated goal is to establish a viable democracy in the once-Baathist regime. To use the neo-conservative lingo; Iraq would be a bastion of transparent and equitable government in a sea of Arab despots. God willing, and this is Bush ruminating, Iraq would expose the error of the despots, and force a popular movement supporting democracy out into the open.

In the meantime, American forces cannot withdraw from the country they helped ravage from the ground up. Just last month, the Democrats mischievously added a caveat to Bush's call for more funds to be released to the American Project in Iraq. A timetable stipulating a deadline for troops to withdraw from Iraq was appended to the bill. As was expected, Bush wielded his Presidential veto to shoot down the bill. There was outrage all round the neo-conservative table. How could the Americans pull out now? Would that not hand victory over to the Iraqi insurgents who had been calling for Americans to leave the country in the first place?

Putting such childish reasons aside, I do agree that pulling the troops out now would lead to disaster. Sectarian hatred, once such a rare thing in Iraq, has been stoked to boiling point, chiefly because of the entry of Salafist-inspired al-Qaeda into the theater of war. Salafists consider all Shia Muslims, which is the dominant group in Iraq, apostates- eminently suited for slaying. Their stance is so extreme that some of the domestic militants, ostensibly Sunni Arabs, have sought to distance themselves from them. While the rabid sectarianism can be laid directly at the door of the Salafist extremists, their entry into Iraq cannot. From the outset, the Bush Administration must have known that a fractured Iraq occupied by American troops would be a tantalizing magnet for such groups, whose members originate from all over the Middle East but chiefly from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The logic was, better that the terrorists fight on the soil of the 'ragheads' than the hallowed soil of the homeland.

But there is another reason why America does not want to pull out anytime soon. A sovereign and independent Iraq would spell disaster for American ambitions. The government would not only be dominated by Shia Muslims, it would also be closely connected with Iran, hitherto a pariah state as far as the Bush Administration is concerned. Furthermore, a strong, viable Shia across Iran and Iraq would surely provoke nationalist sentiments in the already-repressed Shia population in Saudi Arabia, which is a mainstay in America's list of allies.

The solution thus far has been an unimaginative pounding together of disparate individuals and parties into a government that can barely function outside the Green Zone, an area heavily guarded by American and Iraqi troops. The latest weapon brought to bear down on the incessant violence going on in the country is a surge in troop levels and a more aggressive approach in the hunt for terrorists suspects. Indeed, it is the Shia militias instead of the more deadly Sunni militants that have borne the brunt of the American crackdown. This in itself should be instructive. American policymakers fear the prospect of an assertive Shia polity more than the suicide bombings (a tactic shunned by the Shia clergy anyway) carried out by Sunni militants. Why bother, when Sunni targets have almost been exclusively Shia Muslims, marketplaces, rituals and shrines?

07 February 2007

The British documentary about Salafists

Penny Anderson, of The Worldly Event, recently sent me links to a series of videos. It's a documentary made by UK's Channel 4, claiming to be an expose about the Muslim community's radical underbelly in Britain. What's worse, Channel 4 seemed quite adamant to pin the radicalism onto the particular stream of Islam emanating from Saudi Arabia- a stream we've all come to know as either "Wahhabism", or the anachronistic Salafism.

Well, I've viewed it, and my first impression is: it's a very blunt weapon. Shield of Islam's Jinnzaman correctly pointed out that the criticisms leveled against certain Salafist institutions and mosques might very well apply to the rest of the Muslim community. For example, the issues of jihad, Muslim and non-Muslim relations, prayer and hijab for women are not exclusively near and dear to Salafists alone, but to most Muslims. The problem with the documentary is that it took many of the situations and quotes out of context, and does not bother to take a more in-depth look at those issues and present their many facets.

I am not going to analyze the program because it has been making its rounds in the Muslim blogosphere, especially at Mujahidden Ryder's blog, but I will offer some comments off the top of my head.

I think it is very good that mainstream media has finally learned to particularize between Muslims who adhere to orthodoxy and those who subscribe to more ideological interpretations. Such a courtesy was not evident in the early days of the stupidly-named "War on Terror", and a lot of damage has been done in the way of relations between Muslims and the proverbial West because of the lapse.

To be fair, when more astute commentators did try to expose the dubious agendas of certain Muslim groups, these Muslim groups tend to fall back on a tired tactic. Islamaphobia! They'd say. Anti-Muslim sentiment! In fact, I had discussed this public-relations coup in an earlier post:

Dubious institutions propagating a particular brand of Islam have time and again also described attacks on them as being Islamaphobic in nature. By spreading out the criticism amongst the whole community, the intent of such organizations is perhaps to win the sympathy and outrage of a greater number of people than it can realistically muster on its own. A critique on its aims, members and sources of funding, for example, becomes an unprovoked assault on Muslims and Islam itself, even though it never began that way.
That is why I believe it is good that a name is pinned on these movements because that is the first step in isolating them. Such a step is important because it destroys the ridiculous myth that Muslims only come in one shape and size. There are moderates (much as I dislike the term for its inherent condescension) and there are extremists, and the moderates far outweigh the extremists. It's pretty obvious here.

Some labels do invite controversy, however. How useful is such a term as "Wahhabi", for example, when those who fall under that label claim there is no such group?

Indigo Jo gives a careful defense of why the label remains useful.
...it is the convention in Islam to name groups after their founder or after its most prominent characteristic or proponent. In the case of Wahhabism, it is called that because it traces back to Muhammad ibn Abdil-Wahhab.
I agree. History attests to the fact that prominent Saudi scholars had not only been aware of the term, but had rhetorically accepted it. In a widely-circulated fatwa condemning the otherwise unremarkable practice of Muslims celebrating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, Shaykh Abdullah bin Baaz proclaimed that,
...the creed of the Wahhabiyya is based upon fulfillment of witnessing that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allaah and completely abandoning all innovations, superstitions and whatever goes against the Sharee'ah.
I don't quite see what the all the fuss is about, especially since the line of descendants that emerged from Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab is still singled out by his admirers as ahl al-shaykh, meaning, "family of the shaykh".

Now, if "ahl al-Sunna" refers to Sunnis in general, then "ahl al-shaykh" refers to...

I'm not going to insult your intelligence.

13 December 2006

Money, martyrs and mongers

Not only does Saudi Arabia provide money and martyrs for the Iraqi theater of war, help now arrives from the theological front:

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia: Over 30 prominent Islamic clerics from Saudi Arabia on Monday called on Sunni Muslims around the Middle East to support their brethren in Iraq against Shiites and praised the insurgency.

The clerics issued a statement warning that Shiite Muslims were taking control of Iraq in a conspiracy with "Crusaders" in an attempt to marginalize Sunni Muslims.

Thousands of Iraqis have been killed this year in sectarian bloodshed between the majority Shiites and the Sunni Arab minority, who lost their dominance of the country to Shiites after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Saudi Arabia, like most Arab countries, is predominantly Sunni but has a significant Shiite minority. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt have all expressed concerns over increasing Shiite power in Iraq and other parts of the region, which they see as an opening for Iranian influence.

The statement was signed by more than 30 Saudi clerics — most from Saudi Arabia's top Islamic universities, the centers of the kingdom's hardline version of Sunni Islam.

"After almost four years of occupation, it is clear that the aim behind this occupation is for the Crusaders and Shiites to take control of Iraq, paving the way to complete their control over the region," read the statement, posted on a Saudi news Web site.

The clerics praised Iraq's Sunni insurgency, saying that jihad, or holy war, "is one of the most important tenets of religion, and what has been taken by force can only be regained by force."

They called on Sunni Muslims around the Middle East to "stand directly with our Sunni brothers in Iraq, using all appropriate and considered forms of support" and urged clerics to "educate the public about the Shiite threat."

The sectarian conflict in Iraq has raised fears of a growing split between the two main sects of Islam around the Middle East as members of each rally around their brethren there.

Key Iraqi officials have said that millions of dollars in financing has been sent to Iraq's insurgents private donors in Saudi Arabia, though Saudi officials have denied the report.

28 November 2006

Mesquita politics

A Muslim friend once told me that the word mosque was derived from the word mosquito. "It's a Crusader plot to defame Muslims," he confided. Like most conspiracy theories, however, it's plain baloney. First of all, the Crusaders are dead. Second of all, Crusaders were too stupid to have concocted any sort of etymological device to describe their enemies. The height of Crusader ingenuity was probably describing their feet being colored to the ankles with the blood of the slain Jews and Muslims of Jerusalem.

But mosques are interesting in other ways. When extremists want to show the Shias in Iraq who is boss, they bomb the domes off Shia mosques. Now, if you think bombing domes are an odd way of sending a message, think again. History attests that some Muslims- well, actually those belonging to a certain strain- have been at domes for a long time, including the green one that is currently above Prophet Muhammad's grave.

Why the dome-fetish, though? Some Muslims apparently believe that building domes above the graves of holy men promotes shirik (idolatry). In the world of the dome-destroyers, the logic even extends to Prophet Muhammad's tomb.

In some countries, mosques are seen as a barometer for radical teachings. India for example, has this exquisite national monument, the Grand Mosque, that is in urgent need of repair. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia offered to pump in money to fund the reconstruction. The Indian media, ever the rabid watchdog over its troublesome minorities, was quick to point out that the offer had a caveat. The kingdom apparently wants to fund education too. Naturally, Indian security agencies are wary that the money could go into preaching radical Islam.

But that's all fluff. If I were an Indian Muslim, I would be more worried about the Grand Mosque not keeping its distinctive style. Not only is it an eclectic mix of Hindu and Muslim architecture, there are three graves within the mosque's compound. And its obscene complement of fifteen domes (yes, 15!) can only belong in a dome-destroyer's fantasy.

The re-construction might degenerate into a de-construction project, as happened in the Saudi-aided reconstruction of Sarajevo's mosques in the aftermath of the Bosnian genocide. A mosque that is deliberately torn from its native context- as expressed through its unique architecture- is well on its way to nurturing an exclusivist mindset amongst Muslims that India can frankly do less with.

Then, there's good old England. According to Guardian Unlimited:

A plan to build a 'mega mosque' in east London has become mired in controversy with allegations that it is being bankrolled by Islamist groups in Saudi Arabia. Opponents say it would promote a radical form of Islam. They accuse its backers of not consulting local people.

Tablighi Jamaat, the controversial Islamist sect that has applied for planning permission for the multi-million-pound mosque, has been described by French intelligence as 'an antechamber of fundamentalism'. This evangelical movement, which has gained a strong following among young male Muslims, is a Deobandi Muslim organisation that has close links with the Wahhabi fundamentalist form of the religion promoted in Saudi Arabia and practised by the Saudi royal family.

The sect, which bought the brownfield site in the early Nineties, has sent hundreds of British Muslims to madrassas - religious schools - in Pakistan each year. There are concerns within British intelligence that these trips may have radicalised some of them. Followers have also attended the sect's Saudi-financed UK headquarters in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. They include Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, two of the bombers who struck London on 7 July last year.
Oddly enough, the mosque has created a unique coalition of protesters comprising local Muslims and Christians. Way to go, silent majority!

Not all mosques create controvosy, of course. My own experience at a mosque I visited several years ago brought me near tears. But that was in a country that's been called a city of Tassawwuf (Sufism) and grave-worship in some social circles.

31 October 2006

Schwartz's Words of Mass Distortion

In an article written for Family Security Matters, Stephen Schwartz rhetorically asked "Is California an Islamic Republic?", and directly accused the state's most prominent Muslim, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, of being a dishonest person and a poseur.

Sidi Aftab Ahmad Malik [1] responds:

In his recent article: Is California an Islamic Republic? (The Family Security Foundation, Inc., October 25, 2006), Stephen Schwartz, in his tireless search for an opportunity to profess his undying patriotism, has written a personal attack against Hamza Yusuf Hanson. The nominal basis for his attack is an article in a Saudi newspaper, in which Hamza Yusuf "was described as 'the mufti of California.'" It is not clear how accurately this was translated for him, particularly as he later states that "It is Hamza Yusuf Hanson who is dishonest, when he calls himself, ridiculously, 'the mufti of California,' and when he claims to be a Muslim moderate." Schwartz's claim then, is that Yusuf has been called or has called himself the mufti of California and, therefore, Schwartz claims, "propagandizes for the Islamicization of America," based on how Yusuf has "built himself up as a major Western Muslim leader."

My immediate response is to question why Schwartz has searched out this reference (of questionable accuracy) to denounce Hamza Yusuf. Why does he go to such pains to try to convince his readership that Yusuf is an extremist who does not speak for the majority of Muslims? The implication of course, is that Schwartz is a moderate Muslim (struggling for plurality) and in fact speaks for the majority of mainstream Muslims. In fact, Schwartz has a long record of denouncing other Muslims as either being Islamists, Jihadists, or Wahhabis—all words that the public has been taught to "understand" represent three incarnations of everything evil in the world today. While the reality remains that many Americans still cannot make sense of Islam, Schwartz's simplistic articles only offer a dangerous black and white view of a complex landscape. I find it astonishing that Schwartz, the executive director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism cannot even recognize the plurality within the Muslim community itself, and rather than acknowledge this, he demarcates disperse communities into moderates versus extremists.

Schwartz's unabashed attack on Hamza Yusuf is at best misguided and at worst libelous. His continued character assassination of one of the most distinguished, loved, and brilliant Muslim scholars in the Western world is enough to discredit him in the eyes of many mainstream Muslims. The respect that Yusuf commands from numerous sectors of the Muslim community throughout the world is unquestioned; it is based on nearly fifteen years of studying with scholars throughout the world, in a tireless effort to grasp the depth of traditional Islamic scholarship. Schwartz himself wrote a moving obituary of the late "famous Sufi teacher" and scholar, Shaykh Muhammad Alawi, in which he highlights the authority that Alawi commanded. And it is this very same Muhammad Alawi that is counted among the teachers of Hamza Yusuf, who was awarded a handwritten diploma by the Shaykh—something that Alawi rarely did—conferring upon Yusuf the licence to teach the Islamic sciences, which include Sufism.

I find it lamentable that Schwartz maintains this misguided assertion that Hamza Yusuf is dishonestly portraying himself as a Sufi and hiding ulterior motives that only Schwartz has been able to decipher (the rest of the gullible world has failed to recognize these ill-intentions). Surely this, above and beyond his other outlandish claims, clearly indicates that Schwartz is a man with an agenda and far from a serious or scholarly commentator on Islamic affairs. I question Schwartz's intentions because he is most likely aware of and has met many contemporary Sufi shaykhs from America to Great Britain; West Africa to the Middle East; the Subcontinent to the Arabian peninsula, who confirm and acknowledge Yusuf as being counted among the qawm—a sufi term that refers to "the people [of spiritual excellence]." Could Schwartz's accusations stem from such a superficial fact that Yusuf does not dress like a Sufi shaykh, but wears western clothes? (I have actually met some individuals who criticize his ability to be a shaykh precisely because of this.) Or, perhaps Schwartz is irked by the fact that Yusuf is invited by a wide range of people to speak to diverse audiences, some of whom may not see eyeto- eye with the spiritual tradition of Islam?

Ironically, back in 1997 at Stanford University, the late expert on Sufism, Annemarie Schimmel, Hamid Algar of the University of Berkeley, and Hamza Yusuf spoke on the theme of "Sufism and its influence on Europe." In closing the program, Yusuf stressed that Sufism was an integral part of Islam, stating that "in the tradition of Islam Sufism has always been part of the traditional Islamic curriculum in every single Muslim university." He continued to remark that he knew of "no period in the Islamic tradition in which Sufism was not taught in the universities and not seen as an important and fundamental aspect of the tradition of Islam." More ironic yet is the fact that this favorable write-up of the event was (and remains) posted on the Naqshbandi.org website, a prominent Sufi group that operates under the auspices of the Sufi sage, Mawlana Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani. If we believe, as Schwartz proposes, that Yusuf decided to transform himself from a "radical" Muslim preacher into a spiritual Sufi, the author of the lengthy article would not have concluded by saying that this event took "great courage" and was a "courageous stand" in the light of the fact that (at that time) Sufism was perceived by many Muslims as something alien to Islam—clearly a result of the strength of a Wahhabi-brand of Islam.

I actually agree with Schwartz on one issue: it is ridiculous for Hamza Yusuf to call himself "the mufti of California"; I daresay that Yusuf would consider it ridiculous as well. I doubt that Schwartz's reference to the article in the Saudi newspaper is accurate. But I would correct Schwartz on the role of a mufti. He confusingly defines a mufti as a "religious judge, directing sharia courts in Sunni Muslim countries," (one would think a fairly substantial position of authority), then says that California does not need a mufti, "because Sharia governs such minor aspects of Islamic life as the issuance of halal butchers' licenses…and the propriety of certain financial transactions." Schwartz reveals his ignorance of the sharia, not to mention the role of a mufti. Then he goes on to clarify (for those unaware!) that California does not have sharia courts.

By way of clarification, a mufti fulfils a role that goes beyond merely declaring meat halal. The role of a mufti is more akin to that of a rabbi and an imam to that of a cantor. A rabbi explains Torah and Mishnah to his congregants and the function of a mufti is to explain the Qur'an and the Prophetic way to his followers; this can relate to everything from how to prepare oneself for prayer to whether insurance is a halal financial transaction. A mufti gives non-binding legal opinions and has no state authority, nor can his opinions be enforced by the state in most matters. Muslim nations often appoint a Grand Mufti, as in Egypt, but most muftis actually have no state affiliation. Muftis are also noted for their intellectual ability and moral character. Indeed, the late Dr. Zaki Badawi of London was, in one of his obituaries, referred to as the "Grand Mufti of Islam in England." There were no sensationalist headlines the following day that sought to explain how all along, Zaki Badawi the mild-mannered moderate Muslim, was a stealth Islamist by night, because it simply would not be true. Rather, the title was bestowed upon him as a mark of respect and acknowledgement of his intellectual prowess, authority and admiration he had earned from many people, Muslims and non- Muslims alike in the UK.

In his article, Schwartz has manipulated the facts in order to create a fictional scenario in which a fictional character (only nominally based upon the real Hamza Yusuf) has a fictitious aim of establishing an Islamic republic in California. The only credence that Schwartz has that lends itself to this mythical construct is a quote by Zaid Shakir (who he inaccurately refers to as Ziad Shakir), in which Shakir remarked that he would "like to see America become a Muslim country." Had he known Shakir personally, Schwartz would have understood the inaccuracy of his explanation. Shakir's remark is no more than an imitation of the Prophet Muhammad's words: "Love for humanity what you love for yourself." Shakir, a dedicated savant and intellectual giant, said that to love what he loves (and clearly, Zaid Shakir loves Islam), how could he not wish for other people to enjoy what he enjoys from Islam? As the late Betty Shabaz remarked, only people of violence read violence into Malcolm's words and I would add that only those who want to feed the current climate of fear, announce it wherever they can.

Hamza Yusuf has been vociferous in the past as well as the present, on the topic of those who seek to subvert the lands in which they live, and has said in no uncertain terms that these people should leave—if they wish to live under Islamic law, there is nothing preventing them from moving to those lands in which it is the rule of the land. At the same time, Yusuf has not made secret his views on what he sees as the ailments of the society in which he lives. There is gross inequality in the distribution of wealth, the educational system is not producing rounded human beings, and there are areas in America where there is intense racial tension and segregation. While Yusuf has openly criticized the country's foreign policy, he has emphasized that foreign policy should not be seen as synonymous with the American people; this is a message that he has particularly stressed when speaking in the Middle East. The problem we face is that despite the Internet and talk about a global village, there still remains a huge gulf between the West and the Muslim world.

To be patriotic (and Schwartz implicitly implies that Yusuf is not), does not mean to turn a blind eye to injustices. To be loyal or zealously support one's country can be dangerous if it is merely another name for crude nationalism. True patriotism—to truly have a great love for one's country—would include exercising one's judgment, evaluating policies, and engaging in discussions. When Yusuf says that most Americans do not comprehend Islam or that racism is a real concern, he is not revealing a conspiracy of hate toward America. These are issues that have been debated for decades by many (non-Muslim) social scientists and (non-Muslim) religious/political commentators. It is only at the mercy of Schwartz's pen that such concerns are twisted and morphed into a sinister and threatening menace. In an environment that is plagued by a virtual avalanche of tracts, writings, and publications that express unrestrained animosity to Islam and Muslims, written by so-called experts on Islam (the vast majority of whom do not read, write, or speak Arabic), the quest for sanity and balance seems lost within a quagmire of suspicion and self-appointed "moderate" Muslim leaders. The only losers in the end will be the principles of equity, integrity, and justice. When these are lost, what reigns is anarchy, and this will ultimately lead to the perpetuation of hate crimes.
Notes:
[1] Editor of The State We Are In: Identity, Terror and the Law of Jihad and Visiting fellow at the Center of Culture and Ethnicity, University of Birmingham (UK)

03 October 2006

If Rice could fly

Once again, America is barking up the wrong tree. US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice has stated that one of the main aims of her tour of the Middle East is to fire up moderate Muslims in the region.

"We are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all the people."
Her words are ironic, considering that two of her more significant pitstops are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I may be wrong, but that's probably why the democratic line is being liberally coated in fluff and spin. Instead, she emphasizes more on forces of moderation, a label into which Saudi Arabia and Egypt might be dropped into without uncomfortable questions being asked.

Rice knows, of course, that if the popular vote is ever served in those two contries, Israel's place in that part of the world would hang in a precarious balance. Hamas' totally expected win in Palestinian elections is a case in point.

America might be the global evangelist for freedom and liberties, but when it comes to the Middle East, the carrot that is democracy attracts some rather unsavory characters. Successive US administrations have tolerated political repression in those countries because its mechanisms also help crack down on extremists who are anti-western by default.

What Rice fails to understand in a spectacular fashion is that places like Saudi Arabia are moderate only insomuch as they serve American geo-political interests. I think it is extremely unlikely, for example, to find even the most indifferent Arab Muslim siding with Israel's continued occupation over large and fertile portions of the West Bank. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been too long-drawn and painful for anyone to carry an objective view of things. The land has become this generation's new idol for monotheists who pride themselves over their uncompromising belief in one God.

But that does not even begin to address the perennial blister that is Iran. The US' continued appeasement of Saudi Arabia, in spite of the vicious anti-western rhetoric coming out from the kingdom's pulpits, must be seen against the context of the version of Islam that dominates not only the regime's religious authorities, but also extremist groups the world over.

Such groups nurture a habit of intense hatred against all Shia. The hostility is a strategic asset that is useful at a time when Iran- the center of the Shi'i sect- appears to be in ascendant form. Worse, Israel's foolish adventure into Lebanon has only managed to enhance Iran's prestige. What better counterweight is there than to enlist the ideological aid of another group that already demonizes the Shi'ias?

It seems that the US has not entirely shaken off its penchant for interfering in the Middle East, pitting one so-called tribe against the other, so that its wider interests of ensuring a cheap supply of oil continues to be served. In this, George Bush broke his promise never again to appease Arab dictators.

While the US rightly fears an arms-race developing in that volatile region, it should perhaps first revise its inconsistent policy on Israel's own formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, attempting to exploit a particular brand of Islam that totally opposes Shi'ism is short-sighted and possibly destructive, especially since the government that is emerging in Iraq shares with Iran the "unfortunate" distinction of being predominantly Shia.

Did the US not cultivate the same kind of "force" in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion? Did the al-Qaida not rise from the ashes of that force?

Stop choosing the easy way out, Rice.

07 July 2006

Khaled Abou El Fadl in Singapore

All credit to Wardah Books for covering Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl's recent visit to Singapore.

Besides promoting his book, The Great Theft, Professor Khaled also gave an interview to the Straits Times. The contents of the interview are nothing less than fascinating and signals a hopeful direction that Southeast Asian Muslims are charting for themselves. I reproduce it in full below, bolding the parts I feel are important.


"There may need to be sacrificial lambs. I'm going to play this role and speak my conscience."
Dr Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic law at UCLA and Bush appointee to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, is the academic voice of the world's majority moderate Muslims. In an exclusive interview with The Straits Times, he discusses his new book, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From The Extremists, which the Associated Press has called 'the most dramatic manifesto from an American Muslim since the September 11 attacks'.

By John R. Bradley

Senior Writer

.Q. You write in The Great Theft: 'The essential lesson taught by Islamic history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of Islam; they are marginalised, and they eventually come to be treated as a heretical aberration to the Islamic message.' Is there really much cause for hope that the 21st century will follow this pattern?

A. If I think as a scientist and a calculating man and evaluate the data objectively, the tone of my book would not be justified. But if I evaluate it as a Muslim who believes that - as the Quran says - Islam is a message sent as a mercy to humanity, that the ideas that are the main justification of Islam are mercy to humanity and 'peace be upon you', as we consistently repeat, then, as a matter of faith, I believe that if the moderate Muslims pay their dues, God will aid them and we will be victorious.

They just have to get off their lazy posterior, realise the danger and spring into action. This, I believe, is what God expects of them. At least, I believe it is what God expects of me, and this is why I do what I do.

.Q. But why is it so difficult for moderate Muslims such as yourself, who you say represent the silent majority, to speak out against a minority that encourages intolerant acts of violence?

A. In theory, it should not be difficult for moderate Muslims to speak out. Indeed, there are many moderate Muslim writers who write and publish books. But there are two levels of restrictions they face.

The first level is the bar that exists to speaking out. The second, once moderates have managed to speak out, is getting heard. There are a lot of moderate professors who speak about the Islam that is lived by most Muslims in the world, not only an Islam that contributed to the arts and society and humanities, but also an Islam that allows all sorts of societies to exist in which there are - at the micro level and the daily level - human acts of generosity and kindness.

However, once a writer attempts to write about this 'lived' Islam, he must find an outlet. Unfortunately, in the Arabic-speaking world these outlets for moderate, non-Salafi/Wahhabi Muslims have diminished greatly. It used to be the case, for instance, in the 1950s and 1960s that there were publishing outlets in Kuwait, in Lebanon and in Egypt (that gave them a platform).

But what started taking place in the 1970s is that Saudi Arabia commenced on a very concerted and, I would say, a very well thought-out effort to dominate the public discourse on Islam. They did this simply through largesse.

Take, for instance, Dar Al-Risala, a press in Lebanon that published some of the most popular books until the 1980s, a very big and well-known publisher. But in the 1970s it started entering into contracts with the Saudi government, which would buy one thousand copies of each book - and pay in hard currency. In this way, Saudi Arabia attained amazing power over Dar Al-Risala.

When Dar Al-Risala contemplated publishing a book Saudi Arabia disapproved of, the Saudi government would inform the publisher that he would become persona non grata, or the contracts would either diminish or be cancelled altogether. This is just one example of what was repeated again and again.

.Q. Do you not think that there is a danger of simplifying the issue by singling out the Al-Saud ruling family, and by extension the Wahhabism it sponsors, as the root cause of Islamic extremism?

A. It is not the only factor, by far, and my writings emphasise that this is not the only source of fanaticism. But it is the most important. With the help of the British, the Al-Saud dismantled the Caliphate (in the 1920s) and altered in fundamental and material ways the nature of the major holy sites of Islam.

For instance, it used to be the case that in Mecca there were religious structures, usually directed towards the qibla (the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays), that symbolised the different schools of Islamic thought. They existed for the Shafi'is, for the Hanafis, for the Hanbalis and the Malikis. Just as there used to be for the Shi'ite Jaafaris. There used to be several for the Sufis in the vicinity of the ka'abah as well.

Having these symbolic structures was a declaration of legitimacy, basically saying that all these expressions of Islam were legitimate. When the Saudis took control of Mecca, they destroyed all of them. They had existed for about 1,200 years. The Al-Saud declared that the reason was that we need not have all these expressions of Islam because Islam is clear and is one.

Furthermore, they destroyed 90 per cent of the historical sites that existed in Mecca and Medina. These provided Islam's history that could be explored, studied and investigated - ideologically and anthropologically. This way the story of the Islamic experience would most likely become a very sophisticated one.

It was all wiped out, so that Islam became a religion without a history, (apart from) the highly idealised time of the Prophet and his companions. But even (their) historical sites were destroyed - denying Muslims and scientists the chance to pose even basic questions about the pluralistic faith.

.Q. Is there something in Arab cultures, say tribalism, that is somehow related to extremist interpretations of Islam?

A. There is a tribal element, but a slightly different (and more important issue) is the Bedouin element. Tribalism has existed in most of the world. You look at a country like England. Until the Romans left, it was a fairly tribal society, as was France, as was even Venice. But that was not necessarily an obstruction to the development of humanistic ideas and human values.

But Bedouinism, as opposed to tribalism, is the existence of a system of allegiance to a family or tribe in an environment that is arid and rather uncomplicated, compared to the urban centres, and in which either someone was your friend or your enemy. You existed in a state of all-out war, and there was a presumption that someone was out to get you until proven otherwise. You needed a military-type structure that needed a leader who could not be questioned. The environment was often a mentality of black and white or yes and no, not the cultured mentality of the arts and sciences and humanities and of philosophy and contemplation. The Quran itself is quite critical of Bedouin society, and speaks about the immoderate nature of those who remain with a Bedouin mentality.

(In contrast) take countries like Egypt or Syria or Iraq. These were highly developed, cosmopolitan places. You had layers of civilisational experiences that created an appreciation for the product of the intellect and sophisticated thought, and an inability to see things as black and white anymore.

.Q. So how does this manifest itself among today's extremists?

A. It is interesting that in the past few decades, if you look at all the sources of violence, they have all been touched by, or emerged from, Bedouin Islam. What I mean is that they have been touched by the Puritanism of Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab, (the 18th-century founder of Wahhabism). This does not mean that he was the only Puritan. But his ideas were married to Saudi resources, and therefore become an enormous problem.

Such Puritanism is a phenomenon that tends to have no appreciation for history, which tends to see the world in terms of how everyone is out to get you unless they prove otherwise, that devalues women and expects obedience from the flock, which should always obey. If the flock participates, it is through the 'grace' of the leader, who allows it the 'privilege' of expressing an opinion.

This Bedouin mentality also contributes to the radical anti-rationalism (of the extremists). In all the violent movements today, we witness the idea that rationalism is the instrument of the Devil, and is fundamentally evil. You find that all (the leading terrorist ideologues) have been influenced by a black-and-white concept: that all people fall either into the category of good or the category of bad.

.Q. So were there other influences in South-east Asia, both cultural and environmental, which allowed a more tolerant and diverse Islam to emerge and flourish?

A. Of course. I'll give you a simple example. Islam in South-east Asia is full of music. When I visited Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, there were events held in my honour, and singers were invited. Now, it is inconceivable in the Arab world that a Muslim scholar would be celebrated by music. The denial of music is a new thing, and is influenced by Wahhabism, which condemns music because it excites the imagination.

In Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Islam is full of music and beauty and expressions of intoxication for the Divine. In fact, if it hadn't been for the Sufis and their ecstasies and the _expression of it through various means, especially in music and poetry, I doubt very much whether Islam would have spread in that part of the world.

.Q. But there is a growing fear that the harsh 'Bedouin Islam' of Arabia is making inroads in this region, into the more tolerant and relaxed 'Islam of the Tropics'.

A. (When I was in the region last year,) every scholar that I spoke to, every official I spoke to, said their main concern was that they have these groups or organisations that are funded by Saudi Arabia, whose officials come in and say lots of the local practices vis-a-vis women are haram (forbidden), vis-a-vis music, poetry and art are haram.

I'll give two minor examples. In Wahhabi Islam, women may not visit graves. And clapping in appreciation is (considered) haram, or religiously forbidden. All this is unique to Wahhabi Islam. When I was growing up in the Islamic world, people used to laugh at the idea that women must not visit graves, because it is based on an absurd idea that only makes sense in a Bedouin context - that women are emotionally vulnerable. (It was thought by Bedouins that) people of evil character would hang out by the graves and attempt to seduce and entice the women.

To my great dismay, I found that this idea, and the idea that people ought not to clap, was now far more widespread and accepted. Little things like that are micro barometers of what is going on.

.Q. What is going on?

A. Before I came to the region, there was a virtual battle as to whether I should come or not. The Wahhabis got the party that initially invited me to Malaysia to cancel. It was only through the efforts of the fellows in Singapore that someone else was found to invite me, because in Singapore they were outraged.

In Singapore itself, although I did several lectures and met several government officials and found the Minister for Islamic Affairs a very, very decent fellow, at one of the lectures I gave in Arabic - well, the Wahhabi party came to the lecture and they were so remarkably rude and disruptive. They kept slamming books, rolling their eyes, and would not engage me. I repeatedly said: 'If there are some people here who are unhappy I invite them to express what they think is so wrong with what I said.' But not a single one of them spoke. It was a challenge to keep my temper.
If time and opportunity permits, I will review Professor Khaled's book in the near future.

12 June 2006

The price of criticizing Ibn Taymiyya

I wonder if media outlets like the BBC even understand half the contents about Islam that they put on their website. Take this article, for example, in which a Saudi journalist had had the gall to challenge the writings of Ibn Taymiyya. The teachings of the thirteenth century scholar, of course, underpins the whole religious establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

For his trouble, Jamal Kashoggi was sacked from the Saudi paper, al-Watan and has since based himself in Washington as media advisor to the Saudi ambassador to the US. Oddly enough, in a recent interview, he said,

"I feel good about the price that was paid because it opened up the door for more openness in the Saudi media...

It's now very common for Saudi intellectuals to argue even with the Grand Mufti, and this is very healthy. We will always maintain our respect for our scholars and clergy and muftis - but at the same time one of the good things about our Wahhabi background is we see no-one as holy except God himself."
Now, is he implying that Muslims with a non-Wahhabi background actually perform the reverse? That such Muslims in fact allow their respect for scholars and clergy and muftis to spill over into the messy business of placing these same people beside God in holiness?

A little help, please?

06 June 2006

Don't kill the speech therapist

I was listening to a BBC reporter interview a Hamas official, and wondered why the first feeling I got was that of incredulity. I must be honest here; for some reason, I always cringe when I hear a Middle Eastern accent on the news. It's not the accent, really, but the manner in which a message is delivered, a speech is read out or a question is answered. There just isn't any organization I can relate to, and I am often left feeling a little frustrated.

Part of the feeling might be blamed on an unconscious stereotype I must have of Arabs. There is little need to hide the pernicious influence of Western media in this respect. But I don't believe that it plays such a large part because I feel the same way whenever Israeli officials are interviewed. Benjamin Netanyahu and Dory Gold are exceptions, though. Both are accomplished orators with nice American, news-friendly accents.

In contrast, people like the Hamas official are partial toward:

1. Repetitive emphasis
People from that part of the world seem to believe that an argument can be made stronger if certain demonstrative pronouns (most notably, that) are repeated, ad infinitum. For example, the sentence:

What Israel is doing in the occupied territories is criminal, unjust and oppressive.
The Hamas official renders it thus:
What Israel is doing in occupation. That is criminal. That is unjust. That is oppressive.
It's butchery of the language, plain and simple. Then, there is always the syndrome of...

2. Too many ANDs
In this instance, a variation of the example sentence could be rendered thus by a Hamas official:
What Israel is doing in occupation. That is criminal, and unjust, and oppressive.
Replacing a perfectly-usable comma (pause in speech) with mulitple ANDs smacks of being ill-prepared, as if the person being interviewed is ad-libbing things right off his head. The official is not putting forth a case. He is ranting. It weakens authority and legitimacy.

But the thing that takes the cake is...

3. Answering questions with questions
Drawing moral analogies is a favorite tactic of Middle Easterners. For example, when the BBC reporter put it to the Hamas representative that some Muslim theologians regard suicide bombing as wrong; the former immediately kicks into high gear and counters:
You should talk about Israeli targetted killings, and demolishing of homes, and preventing pregnant women from reaching the hospital, and shooting at little boys and girls.
Though the comparison is, in my personal opinion, justified, the question remains unanswered. What is so damaging is that most listeners will discard the comparison and gleefully focus on the clumsy manner in which the question was evaded.

In all fairness, Israeli officials are masters of this tactic too; only they do it much more subtly, though I don't exactly know how.

I observed more things, like the perennial undercurrent of rage that makes the Hamas official sound like all spit and sputter, or the tendency to speak faster and in a higher pitch when the questions become too difficult. While it is conceivable that some Western reporters deliberately provoke such responses, or that the news producers edit the interview in the most unfavorable light possible, part of the problem really lies with the Arabs' lack of a competent public relations machine.

The fiasco even turns up in print. Take the Saudi response to an article in the Independant accusing Saudi authorities of purposefully destroying historic landmarks in Mecca and Medina.
Dear Sir,

What rubbish.

But then what would you expect if you use two completely unreliable sources: Ali Al-Ahmed, a disgruntled one man 'organisation', whose modus operandi is to spew out anti Saudi material of any kind (its basis on fact being fairly irrelevant) and Sami Angawi, the equally disgruntled former director of the Pilgrimage Research Centre who was fired for the mismanagement of affairs and wants to attack all those that now have responsibility for the Two Holy Places.

Perhaps your readers would be interested in what is really happening. Every artefact discovered has been preserved and protected and will be displayed in new museums in Makkah and Madinah - indeed some artefacts are already on display. In all, more than $19 billion has been spent on preserving and maintaining these two Holy sites.

We are proud of our rich Islamic heritage. A pride reflected in the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, a title taken by our King. We are also aware of how precious this Islamic heritage is and how important the preservation of this heritage is, not just to us but to the millions of Muslims from around the world who visit the Two Holy Mosques every year, it is hardly something we are going to allow to be destroyed.

Turki Al-Faisal

[source: Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP)]
Because such incapacity should never go unrequited, I present SaveTheHijaz's blistering retort here.

15 May 2006

The kingdom is facing strange times

Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia is a strange man, and I don't mean this in a disrespectful way. He has been in power for a long time, mostly due to the fact that his half brother, Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz had fallen into a coma for ten years before passing away in 2005. As Crown Prince, Abdullah had been commander-in-chief in all but name only. So when he graced the funeral of the Sufi teacher Syed Mohammad Alawi Al-Maliki in 2004, it was a premonition of things to come when he would one day be Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Bad news for the religious establishment who regulate Islam in the kingdom, of course. Syed Alawi is reviled by those who inherit their intellectual and even genealogical lineage from the eighteenth-century preacher, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. The latter, whose line of descendants are known as ahl-al-sheikh, had been instrumental in the initial expansion of the al-Saud tribe into a full-fledged kingdom and the subsequent repression of many traditional aspects of Islam, including Sufism. According to a Saudi Institute report on religious freedom,

Several government-financed books were written by Hanbali clerics to attack Syed Alawi accusing him of Sufism and apostasy. Algerian-born Shaikh Abu Baker Al-Jazairi, who worked as a speaker at the Prophet's mosque and a teacher at the Islamic University in Madina, attacked Syed Alawi in several speeches and in at least one book.

Shaikh Abdullah Bin Manee, a high ranking judge and a member of the Council of Senior Uluma, wrote a book calling Alawi an apostate and a religious deviant. The late Grand Mufti, Shaikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz, wrote the book's forward.
It's a misnomer to characterize the kingdom's scholars as Hanbali, since whatever they take from that particular Madhhab (school of thought) invariably filters through scholars like the thirteenth-century Syrian scholar ibn Taimiyya, who spent his last years in prison for alleged deviancy. As this refreshing website attests, however, the Hanbali Madhhab is very different from the face that emanates from modern movements that claim affiliation with the school of thought. Note the sections on following Madhhabs and even the ruling on the celebration of Mawlid (the Prophet Muhammad's birthday), which a vocal minority condemns as being a blameworthy innovation.

Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz's presence at the funeral of a Sufi sheikh has an air of deliberation about it. He is either trying to bridge the ideological divide between Saudi Salafists and Sunni Muslims, or else, attempting to emasculate the more intolerant of the two. In 2005, he pushed for the kingdom's clerics to sign on the seminal Jordan Initiative, even though many of the groups that were declared by the Initiative to be valid expressions of Islam are actually excommunicated by conservative Salafists. In the long-run, though, the Initiative is a strategic imperative. By officially acknowledging the diverse sects and movements in Islam, Muslim governments hope to destroy the very same tactic of excommunication that Muslim radicals use to justify doing violence on fellow Muslims.

Are we witnessing the demise of the ideology that has been the mainstay of the Islamic discourse for the past two hundred years, so much so that popular movements like the Indonesian Nahdlatul Ulema were formed specifically to counter its vigorous and often tumultuous spread? Did the Jordan Initiative start something good, after all?

Stay tuned!

10 May 2006

Program to eradicate al-Qaida brings up familiar names

The Washington Post's David B. Ottaway writes on Saudi efforts to tackle the al-Qaida ideology that is growing in the kingdom.
There are some interesting excerpts of Ottaway's article that I should comment on:
Saudi Arabia has mobilized some of its most militant clerics, including one Osama bin Laden sought to recruit as his spiritual guide, in a campaign to combat the continuing appeal of al-Qaeda's ideology in the kingdom...

Perhaps the two best-known Wahabi radicals are Salman al-Ouda and Safar al-Hawali. They both spent about five years in prison in the 1990s for criticizing the ruling Saud family for inviting U.S. troops into the kingdom during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War against Iraq.

After the sermon, Saudi authorities pressured Ouda and Hawali in particular to moderate their tone and to help the government combat al-Qaida inside the kingdom. Hawali, the more radical of the two, suffered a stroke last year and has become inactive. Ouda has largely complied, officials said.
Note: Salman al-Ouda, of course, is the supervisor of the popular fatwa-website called IslamToday.

Recently, al-Ouda was in the news for accepting an invitation to a Mawlid (celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) gathering organized by Saudi Sufis. This, in spite of the fact that IslamToday carries a ruling on Mawlid that categorically maintains that,
...introducing a new practice like this birthday observation is tantamount to second-guessing Allah.
Nonetheless, David B. Ottaway's article continues:
Another participant is Obeikan, a former radical Islamic jurist who has publicly challenged Maqdisi and bin Laden to debate their ideology with him.

In an interview at his elegant marble-faced home on the northern outskirts of Riyadh, al-Obeikan recounted that he twice met bin Laden here just before he was expelled by Saudi authorities to Sudan in 1991. The al-Qaida leader sought to convince him to become the spiritual leader of a movement to overthrow the Saud royal family, "like Khomeini," he said, referring to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, spiritual leader of Iran's 1979 lslamic revolution.
Note: Abdel Mohsen al-Obeikan was featured in one of my previous articles, entitled A scholar breaks ranks. His opposition to al-Qaida's ideology should not, therefore, come as a surprise.

Read the rest of Ottaway's piece here...

03 May 2006

Muslim prayer bracelet

The masbahah, or prayer beads, has always been a source of controvosy for some Muslims. Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani- the Saudi scholar who once issued a fatwa urging Palestinians to leave the occupied territories en masse- wrote,

...the subhah (prayer beads) is bid'ah and was not known at the time of the Prophet...
One wonders then what reaction this little device might invite.



It was originally invented by Caroline Baker to count her baby's kicks. Now she and husband Troy have started selling the patented Jacob's Adder bracelet on the internet- and have been surprised by some of the reasons people have given for buying the device.

"Some Muslim people are using it to count how many prayers they've done. Somebody saw it and thought it would be ideal," said Mrs Baker, 28.

27 April 2006

Salvation is just a family affair

David Myatt is certainly no stranger to ideologies, having been active in the neo-Nazi camp and also founding the hardline British National Socialist Movement (BNS). In 1998, all that changed when he walked into a British mosque and announced his conversion to Islam.

David Myatt's discovery of Islam is vividly portrayed in an Internet article he wrote for the Saved Sect website. His association with the Saved Sect speaks volumes on the stream of Islam he is partial to.

The Saved Sect, more formally known as the Savior Sect, receives its name from the famous hadith (tradition):

My nation will be divided into 73 sects, all of them will be in the Fire except for one (the saved sect)...
Like most other Salafist flavors that derive the idea of a saved sect (al-Firqat un-Naajiyah) from the hadith, the Saved Sect merely claims to represent the views of the saved sect without claiming that they themselves are saved.

Though it is disputed by some, the Saved Sect is widely alleged to be an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun, which was set up by Omar Bakri Muhammad as a front outfit for Hizb ut-Tahrir in Saudi Arabia. Al-Muhajiroun broke away from Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1996 and was officially disbanded in 2004.

Tariq Ramadan (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam) calls Hizb ut-Tahrir a Salafist-Reformist group, with clear political aims to re-establish an Islamic caliphate. The Saved Sect- along with its now defunct affiliate, al-Muhajiroun- do not detract much from this aim. Like most Salafist flavors, the Saved Sect shoulders the burden of establishing dawah (evangelism) to remind Muslims- most of whom they deem to be on the brink of apostasy- about their duties.

Their manifesto also includes:
1. Labeling popular scholars such as Sheikh Hamza Yusuf and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi as apostates. Not even Saudi-Salafists like Sheikh ibn Baaz or Sheikh ibn Uthaymeen are spared.

2. Positively identifying the Saudi kingdom as the personification of the ancient cult of secessionists known as Khawaarij (seceders). [see khawaarij]

3. Condemning the practice of taqleed (adherence to a School of Thought) that is widespread amongst Muslims to be a "road to deviation, misguidance, superstition and all other forms of falsehood".  [see taqleed]

4. Labeling Sufism as a deviant sect. [see bid'ah]
Such lists are hardly novel, since ideologies don't ordinarily tolerate one another. The Saved Sect's criticism of popular Saudi sheikhs, for example, ensures hostility from a tireless and well-endowed quarter; that of Saudi Salafism. However, to extend the point about general ideological intolerance, Saudi Salafism does share a common enemy with the Saved Sect. Both groups detest Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and many conservative Salafists label him as the Wicked Mufti. A Mufti, of course, is an Islamic scholar who is qualified to issue religious edicts called fatwas. Combined with the appellation, wicked, it denotes a person who perhaps issues heretical fatwas.

Sheikh al-Qaradawi's brand of deviation, at least according to this article, is called Qaradawism. It's rather unimaginative, but Olivier Roy (Globalised Islam) describes such exercises as entirely typical of ideological groups in Islam.
...[they] tend to have the same habit as did the Soviets, labeling a 'deviation' with the name of the thinker (Suroorism, Qaradawism, Qutbism).
Aside from having a whole movement named after him, Sheikh al-Qaradawi is also the target of any number of threats. They range from relatively harmless name-calling, like being dubbed a "barking dog" by no less a personage than Sheikh Muqbil ibn Haadee al-Waadi'ee, to out-and-out appeals for his execution. In this, Sheikh Abu Basser at-Tartousi, a man who explicitly styles himself a Wahhabi [1] and christens the Saudi regime as a kafir (Islam-rejecting) establishment, quotes a verdict by Saudi Sheikh ibn Uthaymeen [2],
...if he [al-Qaradawi] doesn't repent, he is to be killed as an apostate.

The Saved Sect, however, carefully maintains that it does not,

...advocate any type of violence towards any particular nation.
Yet, ironically enough, in an article entitled "How Islam will dominate the world", the group recommends several ways in which a state or country can become Daar ul-Islam (the domain of Islam). One of them states that Muslims should,
...rise, overthrow the government and implement the Sharee'ah by force...

[1] The original declaration is found in a now-defunct website (www.tibyan.com) whose cached page I have screen-captured for posterity.

[2] His teacher was Sheikh ibn Baaz, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and one of those who had been educated by a teacher from the family of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.

18 April 2006

Can interfaith relations stop extremism?

A CBS poll claims to prove, within a reasonable margin of error, that people's perception of Islam is going down the drain. Margin or no margin, one does not need a poll to know that.

In almost all interfaith gatherings, the agenda inevitably coalesces on the question of Islam's image. I think it saps the agenda somewhat. More can be done instead of simply waxing and waning that Muslims are hated as never before. God forbid that such gatherings should go the way of most OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) meetings.

Nonetheless, it is a fact that most people believe that one of the means to reduce the potential for future terrorism is to build bridges between faiths. While this is a commendable attitude, I have never believed in its realism, not while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, is couched in the absolutist terms of religion. To put it bluntly, peace has little chance of succeeding if terms like Jerusalem, third holiest city of Islam, and Jerusalem, eternal capital of Israel are consistently placed on the negotiating table.

The Israeli position, especially, makes little sense in the tumultuous context of the Tanakh (the Hebrew scriptures). They, of all people, should know the falsity of such claims.

For better or for worse, however, Israel has influential friends in the United States. No group has been more vociferous in supporting America's myopic stance on the Middle East than the Christian premillennialist camp. Malise Ruthven (Fundamentalism, the Search for Meaning) calls them,

theological refugees in a world they no longer control. They have a baleful influence on American foreign policy, by tilting it towards the Jewish state which they aim eventually to obliterate, by converting 'righteous' Jews to Christ. They have damaged the education of American children in some places by adding 'scientific creationism' to the curriculum...On a planetary level, they are selfish, greedy, and stupid, damaging the environment by the excessive use of energy and lobbying against environmental controls. What is the point of saving the planet, they argue, if Jesus is arriving tomorrow?
Interfaith gatherings, while great for fostering relations between the intellectuals and elites of religions, have limited impact on the ground. Sometimes, I suspect that these talks are promoted for their sheer futility, because let's face it, the initiatives and positions adopted by interfaith councils seldom, if ever, trickle down to the sermons delivered from either Christian pulpits or Muslim minbars. No boats are rocked. It's a useful distraction from real problems.

Of greater importance is the dialogue between different Muslim groups. Take this recently-concluded interview with Saudi Sheikh Ayedh al Garni, in which he supports calls for,
...an open dialogue between Sunni, Shiaa and Sufi Muslims.
He further adds,
"We should meet and refer our differences to the Quran and the Sunna."
Now, I am not going to comment on Sheikh Ayedh's inference that Sunni Muslims and Sufi Muslims are two different things. It's obvious he means Salafist Muslims when he mentions Sunni Muslims, even though the Sunni'ism of the majority of Muslims is based on taqlid (adherence) to the four Madhhabs (Schools of Thought) and a qualified acceptance of the science of Tassawwuf (Sufism). This majority is in fact established by the Jordan Initiative, which places the Madhhabs at the apex of a list it calls "true Islam". Why is this an issue? Salafists typically despise taqlid and condemn it every opportunity they get.

Nor am I going to say that any dialogue that transpires should rightly lie between this Sunni majority and the Salafist minority, a conversation that has, in reality, taken place away from the masses.

I merely mentioned Sheikh Ayedh's interview because I w