 "There may need to be sacrificial lambs. I'm going to play this role and speak my conscience."
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Dr Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of
Islamic law at UCLA and Bush appointee to the US Commission on International
Religious Freedom, is the academic voice of the world's majority moderate
Muslims. In an exclusive interview with The Straits Times, he discusses his new
book, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From The Extremists, which the Associated
Press has called 'the most dramatic manifesto from an American Muslim since the
September 11 attacks'.
By John R. Bradley
Senior Writer
.Q. You write in The Great Theft: 'The essential lesson taught by Islamic
history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of Islam; they
are marginalised, and they eventually come to be treated as a heretical
aberration to the Islamic message.' Is there really much cause for hope that the
21st century will follow this pattern?
A. If I think as a scientist and a calculating man and evaluate the data
objectively, the tone of my book would not be justified. But if I evaluate it as
a Muslim who believes that - as the Quran says - Islam is a message sent as a
mercy to humanity, that the ideas that are the main justification of Islam are
mercy to humanity and 'peace be upon you', as we consistently repeat, then, as a
matter of faith, I believe that if the moderate Muslims pay their dues, God will
aid them and we will be victorious.
They just have to get off their lazy posterior, realise the danger and spring
into action. This, I believe, is what God expects of them. At least, I believe
it is what God expects of me, and this is why I do what I do.
.Q. But why is it so difficult for moderate Muslims such as yourself, who you
say represent the silent majority, to speak out against a minority that
encourages intolerant acts of violence?
A. In theory, it should not be difficult for moderate Muslims to speak out.
Indeed, there are many moderate Muslim writers who write and publish books. But
there are two levels of restrictions they face.
The first level is the bar that exists to speaking out. The second, once
moderates have managed to speak out, is getting heard. There are a lot of
moderate professors who speak about the Islam that is lived by most Muslims in
the world, not only an Islam that contributed to the arts and society and
humanities, but also an Islam that allows all sorts of societies to exist in
which there are - at the micro level and the daily level - human acts of
generosity and kindness.
However, once a writer attempts to write about this 'lived' Islam, he must find
an outlet. Unfortunately, in the Arabic-speaking world these outlets for
moderate, non-Salafi/Wahhabi Muslims have diminished greatly. It used to be the
case, for instance, in the 1950s and 1960s that there were publishing outlets in
Kuwait, in Lebanon and in Egypt (that gave them a platform).
But what started taking place in the 1970s is that Saudi Arabia commenced on a
very concerted and, I would say, a very well thought-out effort to dominate the
public discourse on Islam. They did this simply through largesse.
Take, for instance, Dar Al-Risala, a press in Lebanon that published some of the
most popular books until the 1980s, a very big and well-known publisher. But in
the 1970s it started entering into contracts with the Saudi government, which
would buy one thousand copies of each book - and pay in hard currency. In this
way, Saudi Arabia attained amazing power over Dar Al-Risala.
When Dar Al-Risala contemplated publishing a book Saudi Arabia disapproved of,
the Saudi government would inform the publisher that he would become persona non
grata, or the contracts would either diminish or be cancelled altogether. This
is just one example of what was repeated again and again.
.Q. Do you not think that there is a danger of simplifying the issue by
singling out the Al-Saud ruling family, and by extension the Wahhabism it
sponsors, as the root cause of Islamic extremism?
A. It is not the only factor, by far, and my writings emphasise that this is not
the only source of fanaticism. But it is the most important. With the help of
the British, the Al-Saud dismantled the Caliphate (in the 1920s) and altered in
fundamental and material ways the nature of the major holy sites of Islam.
For instance, it used to be the case that in Mecca there were religious
structures, usually directed towards the qibla (the direction that should be
faced when a Muslim prays), that symbolised the different schools of Islamic
thought. They existed for the Shafi'is, for the Hanafis, for the Hanbalis and
the Malikis. Just as there used to be for the Shi'ite Jaafaris. There used to be
several for the Sufis in the vicinity of the ka'abah as well.
Having these symbolic structures was a declaration of legitimacy, basically
saying that all these expressions of Islam were legitimate. When the Saudis took
control of Mecca, they destroyed all of them. They had existed for about 1,200
years. The Al-Saud declared that the reason was that we need not have all these
expressions of Islam because Islam is clear and is one.
Furthermore, they destroyed 90 per cent of the historical sites that existed in
Mecca and Medina. These provided Islam's history that could be explored, studied
and investigated - ideologically and anthropologically. This way the story of
the Islamic experience would most likely become a very sophisticated one.
It was all wiped out, so that Islam became a religion without a history, (apart
from) the highly idealised time of the Prophet and his companions. But even
(their) historical sites were destroyed - denying Muslims and scientists the
chance to pose even basic questions about the pluralistic faith.
.Q. Is there something in Arab cultures, say tribalism, that is somehow related
to extremist interpretations of Islam?
A. There is a tribal element, but a slightly different (and more important
issue) is the Bedouin element. Tribalism has existed in most of the world. You
look at a country like England. Until the Romans left, it was a fairly tribal
society, as was France, as was even Venice. But that was not necessarily an
obstruction to the development of humanistic ideas and human values.
But Bedouinism, as opposed to tribalism, is the existence of a system of
allegiance to a family or tribe in an environment that is arid and rather
uncomplicated, compared to the urban centres, and in which either someone was
your friend or your enemy. You existed in a state of all-out war, and there was
a presumption that someone was out to get you until proven otherwise. You needed
a military-type structure that needed a leader who could not be questioned. The
environment was often a mentality of black and white or yes and no, not the
cultured mentality of the arts and sciences and humanities and of philosophy and
contemplation. The Quran itself is quite critical of Bedouin society, and speaks
about the immoderate nature of those who remain with a Bedouin mentality.
(In contrast) take countries like Egypt or Syria or Iraq. These were highly
developed, cosmopolitan places. You had layers of civilisational experiences
that created an appreciation for the product of the intellect and sophisticated
thought, and an inability to see things as black and white anymore.
.Q. So how does this manifest itself among today's extremists?
A. It is interesting that in the past few decades, if you look at all the
sources of violence, they have all been touched by, or emerged from, Bedouin
Islam. What I mean is that they have been touched by the Puritanism of Mohammed
bin Abdul Wahhab, (the 18th-century founder of Wahhabism). This does not mean
that he was the only Puritan. But his ideas were married to Saudi resources, and
therefore become an enormous problem.
Such Puritanism is a phenomenon that tends to have no appreciation for history,
which tends to see the world in terms of how everyone is out to get you unless
they prove otherwise, that devalues women and expects obedience from the flock,
which should always obey. If the flock participates, it is through the 'grace'
of the leader, who allows it the 'privilege' of expressing an opinion.
This Bedouin mentality also contributes to the radical anti-rationalism (of the
extremists). In all the violent movements today, we witness the idea that
rationalism is the instrument of the Devil, and is fundamentally evil. You find
that all (the leading terrorist ideologues) have been influenced by a
black-and-white concept: that all people fall either into the category of good
or the category of bad.
.Q. So were there other influences in South-east Asia, both cultural and
environmental, which allowed a more tolerant and diverse Islam to emerge and
flourish?
A. Of course. I'll give you a simple example. Islam in South-east Asia is full
of music. When I visited Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, there were events
held in my honour, and singers were invited. Now, it is inconceivable in the
Arab world that a Muslim scholar would be celebrated by music. The denial of
music is a new thing, and is influenced by Wahhabism, which condemns music
because it excites the imagination.
In Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Islam is full of music and beauty and
expressions of intoxication for the Divine. In fact, if it hadn't been for the
Sufis and their ecstasies and the _expression of it through various means,
especially in music and poetry, I doubt very much whether Islam would have
spread in that part of the world.
.Q. But there is a growing fear that the harsh 'Bedouin Islam' of Arabia is
making inroads in this region, into the more tolerant and relaxed 'Islam of the
Tropics'.
A. (When I was in the region last year,)
every scholar that I spoke to, every
official I spoke to, said their main concern was that they have these groups or
organisations that are funded by Saudi Arabia, whose officials come in and say
lots of the local practices vis-a-vis women are haram (forbidden), vis-a-vis
music, poetry and art are haram.
I'll give two minor examples.
In Wahhabi Islam, women may not visit graves. And
clapping in appreciation is (considered) haram, or religiously forbidden. All
this is unique to Wahhabi Islam. When I was growing up in the Islamic world,
people used to laugh at the idea that women must not visit graves, because it is
based on an absurd idea that only makes sense in a Bedouin context - that women
are emotionally vulnerable. (It was thought by Bedouins that) people of evil
character would hang out by the graves and attempt to seduce and entice the
women.
To my great dismay, I found that this idea, and the idea that people ought not
to clap, was now far more widespread and accepted. Little things like that are
micro barometers of what is going on.
.Q. What is going on?
A. Before I came to the region, there was a virtual battle as to whether I
should come or not.
The Wahhabis got the party that initially invited me to
Malaysia to cancel. It was only through the efforts of the fellows in Singapore
that someone else was found to invite me, because in Singapore they were
outraged.
In Singapore itself, although I did several lectures and met several government
officials and found the Minister for Islamic Affairs a very, very decent fellow,
at one of the lectures I gave in Arabic - well, the Wahhabi party came to the
lecture and they were so remarkably rude and disruptive. They kept slamming
books, rolling their eyes, and would not engage me. I repeatedly said: 'If there
are some people here who are unhappy I invite them to express what they think is
so wrong with what I said.' But not a single one of them spoke. It was a
challenge to keep my temper.
If time and opportunity permits, I will review Professor Khaled's book in the near future.