31 October 2006

Schwartz's Words of Mass Distortion

In an article written for Family Security Matters, Stephen Schwartz rhetorically asked "Is California an Islamic Republic?", and directly accused the state's most prominent Muslim, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, of being a dishonest person and a poseur.

Sidi Aftab Ahmad Malik [1] responds:

In his recent article: Is California an Islamic Republic? (The Family Security Foundation, Inc., October 25, 2006), Stephen Schwartz, in his tireless search for an opportunity to profess his undying patriotism, has written a personal attack against Hamza Yusuf Hanson. The nominal basis for his attack is an article in a Saudi newspaper, in which Hamza Yusuf "was described as 'the mufti of California.'" It is not clear how accurately this was translated for him, particularly as he later states that "It is Hamza Yusuf Hanson who is dishonest, when he calls himself, ridiculously, 'the mufti of California,' and when he claims to be a Muslim moderate." Schwartz's claim then, is that Yusuf has been called or has called himself the mufti of California and, therefore, Schwartz claims, "propagandizes for the Islamicization of America," based on how Yusuf has "built himself up as a major Western Muslim leader."

My immediate response is to question why Schwartz has searched out this reference (of questionable accuracy) to denounce Hamza Yusuf. Why does he go to such pains to try to convince his readership that Yusuf is an extremist who does not speak for the majority of Muslims? The implication of course, is that Schwartz is a moderate Muslim (struggling for plurality) and in fact speaks for the majority of mainstream Muslims. In fact, Schwartz has a long record of denouncing other Muslims as either being Islamists, Jihadists, or Wahhabis—all words that the public has been taught to "understand" represent three incarnations of everything evil in the world today. While the reality remains that many Americans still cannot make sense of Islam, Schwartz's simplistic articles only offer a dangerous black and white view of a complex landscape. I find it astonishing that Schwartz, the executive director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism cannot even recognize the plurality within the Muslim community itself, and rather than acknowledge this, he demarcates disperse communities into moderates versus extremists.

Schwartz's unabashed attack on Hamza Yusuf is at best misguided and at worst libelous. His continued character assassination of one of the most distinguished, loved, and brilliant Muslim scholars in the Western world is enough to discredit him in the eyes of many mainstream Muslims. The respect that Yusuf commands from numerous sectors of the Muslim community throughout the world is unquestioned; it is based on nearly fifteen years of studying with scholars throughout the world, in a tireless effort to grasp the depth of traditional Islamic scholarship. Schwartz himself wrote a moving obituary of the late "famous Sufi teacher" and scholar, Shaykh Muhammad Alawi, in which he highlights the authority that Alawi commanded. And it is this very same Muhammad Alawi that is counted among the teachers of Hamza Yusuf, who was awarded a handwritten diploma by the Shaykh—something that Alawi rarely did—conferring upon Yusuf the licence to teach the Islamic sciences, which include Sufism.

I find it lamentable that Schwartz maintains this misguided assertion that Hamza Yusuf is dishonestly portraying himself as a Sufi and hiding ulterior motives that only Schwartz has been able to decipher (the rest of the gullible world has failed to recognize these ill-intentions). Surely this, above and beyond his other outlandish claims, clearly indicates that Schwartz is a man with an agenda and far from a serious or scholarly commentator on Islamic affairs. I question Schwartz's intentions because he is most likely aware of and has met many contemporary Sufi shaykhs from America to Great Britain; West Africa to the Middle East; the Subcontinent to the Arabian peninsula, who confirm and acknowledge Yusuf as being counted among the qawm—a sufi term that refers to "the people [of spiritual excellence]." Could Schwartz's accusations stem from such a superficial fact that Yusuf does not dress like a Sufi shaykh, but wears western clothes? (I have actually met some individuals who criticize his ability to be a shaykh precisely because of this.) Or, perhaps Schwartz is irked by the fact that Yusuf is invited by a wide range of people to speak to diverse audiences, some of whom may not see eyeto- eye with the spiritual tradition of Islam?

Ironically, back in 1997 at Stanford University, the late expert on Sufism, Annemarie Schimmel, Hamid Algar of the University of Berkeley, and Hamza Yusuf spoke on the theme of "Sufism and its influence on Europe." In closing the program, Yusuf stressed that Sufism was an integral part of Islam, stating that "in the tradition of Islam Sufism has always been part of the traditional Islamic curriculum in every single Muslim university." He continued to remark that he knew of "no period in the Islamic tradition in which Sufism was not taught in the universities and not seen as an important and fundamental aspect of the tradition of Islam." More ironic yet is the fact that this favorable write-up of the event was (and remains) posted on the Naqshbandi.org website, a prominent Sufi group that operates under the auspices of the Sufi sage, Mawlana Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani. If we believe, as Schwartz proposes, that Yusuf decided to transform himself from a "radical" Muslim preacher into a spiritual Sufi, the author of the lengthy article would not have concluded by saying that this event took "great courage" and was a "courageous stand" in the light of the fact that (at that time) Sufism was perceived by many Muslims as something alien to Islam—clearly a result of the strength of a Wahhabi-brand of Islam.

I actually agree with Schwartz on one issue: it is ridiculous for Hamza Yusuf to call himself "the mufti of California"; I daresay that Yusuf would consider it ridiculous as well. I doubt that Schwartz's reference to the article in the Saudi newspaper is accurate. But I would correct Schwartz on the role of a mufti. He confusingly defines a mufti as a "religious judge, directing sharia courts in Sunni Muslim countries," (one would think a fairly substantial position of authority), then says that California does not need a mufti, "because Sharia governs such minor aspects of Islamic life as the issuance of halal butchers' licenses…and the propriety of certain financial transactions." Schwartz reveals his ignorance of the sharia, not to mention the role of a mufti. Then he goes on to clarify (for those unaware!) that California does not have sharia courts.

By way of clarification, a mufti fulfils a role that goes beyond merely declaring meat halal. The role of a mufti is more akin to that of a rabbi and an imam to that of a cantor. A rabbi explains Torah and Mishnah to his congregants and the function of a mufti is to explain the Qur'an and the Prophetic way to his followers; this can relate to everything from how to prepare oneself for prayer to whether insurance is a halal financial transaction. A mufti gives non-binding legal opinions and has no state authority, nor can his opinions be enforced by the state in most matters. Muslim nations often appoint a Grand Mufti, as in Egypt, but most muftis actually have no state affiliation. Muftis are also noted for their intellectual ability and moral character. Indeed, the late Dr. Zaki Badawi of London was, in one of his obituaries, referred to as the "Grand Mufti of Islam in England." There were no sensationalist headlines the following day that sought to explain how all along, Zaki Badawi the mild-mannered moderate Muslim, was a stealth Islamist by night, because it simply would not be true. Rather, the title was bestowed upon him as a mark of respect and acknowledgement of his intellectual prowess, authority and admiration he had earned from many people, Muslims and non- Muslims alike in the UK.

In his article, Schwartz has manipulated the facts in order to create a fictional scenario in which a fictional character (only nominally based upon the real Hamza Yusuf) has a fictitious aim of establishing an Islamic republic in California. The only credence that Schwartz has that lends itself to this mythical construct is a quote by Zaid Shakir (who he inaccurately refers to as Ziad Shakir), in which Shakir remarked that he would "like to see America become a Muslim country." Had he known Shakir personally, Schwartz would have understood the inaccuracy of his explanation. Shakir's remark is no more than an imitation of the Prophet Muhammad's words: "Love for humanity what you love for yourself." Shakir, a dedicated savant and intellectual giant, said that to love what he loves (and clearly, Zaid Shakir loves Islam), how could he not wish for other people to enjoy what he enjoys from Islam? As the late Betty Shabaz remarked, only people of violence read violence into Malcolm's words and I would add that only those who want to feed the current climate of fear, announce it wherever they can.

Hamza Yusuf has been vociferous in the past as well as the present, on the topic of those who seek to subvert the lands in which they live, and has said in no uncertain terms that these people should leave—if they wish to live under Islamic law, there is nothing preventing them from moving to those lands in which it is the rule of the land. At the same time, Yusuf has not made secret his views on what he sees as the ailments of the society in which he lives. There is gross inequality in the distribution of wealth, the educational system is not producing rounded human beings, and there are areas in America where there is intense racial tension and segregation. While Yusuf has openly criticized the country's foreign policy, he has emphasized that foreign policy should not be seen as synonymous with the American people; this is a message that he has particularly stressed when speaking in the Middle East. The problem we face is that despite the Internet and talk about a global village, there still remains a huge gulf between the West and the Muslim world.

To be patriotic (and Schwartz implicitly implies that Yusuf is not), does not mean to turn a blind eye to injustices. To be loyal or zealously support one's country can be dangerous if it is merely another name for crude nationalism. True patriotism—to truly have a great love for one's country—would include exercising one's judgment, evaluating policies, and engaging in discussions. When Yusuf says that most Americans do not comprehend Islam or that racism is a real concern, he is not revealing a conspiracy of hate toward America. These are issues that have been debated for decades by many (non-Muslim) social scientists and (non-Muslim) religious/political commentators. It is only at the mercy of Schwartz's pen that such concerns are twisted and morphed into a sinister and threatening menace. In an environment that is plagued by a virtual avalanche of tracts, writings, and publications that express unrestrained animosity to Islam and Muslims, written by so-called experts on Islam (the vast majority of whom do not read, write, or speak Arabic), the quest for sanity and balance seems lost within a quagmire of suspicion and self-appointed "moderate" Muslim leaders. The only losers in the end will be the principles of equity, integrity, and justice. When these are lost, what reigns is anarchy, and this will ultimately lead to the perpetuation of hate crimes.
Notes:
[1] Editor of The State We Are In: Identity, Terror and the Law of Jihad and Visiting fellow at the Center of Culture and Ethnicity, University of Birmingham (UK)

20 October 2006

You speak, he hears

As for visiting God's Messenger, on him be peace: you must stand before him in the manner we have described, visiting him in death as you would have visited him in life. Do not approach his tomb except as you would have approached his noble person if he had been alive. Just as you would have considered it respectful to refrain from touching or kissing his person, rather standing back and bowing before him, you should now act accordingly. Touching and kissing tombs is a custom of Christians and Jews. Realize that he is aware of your presence, of your standing there and of your visit; that he is receiving your greeting and benediction. Imagine his noble form as it lies in the tomb in front of you. Feel in your heart his tremendous dignity. For he is reported as saying that God, Exalted is He, has appointed to his tomb an angel who conveys to him the salutations of those members of his Community who salute him.

This refers to those who are not actually present, so how about those who leave home and cross desert wastes from longing to meet him, content merely to behold his noble shrine since they have no possibility of witnessing his noble countenance? He said, on him be peace: 'When someone blesses me once, God blesses him ten times.' This refers to the reward for oral benediction, so how about the reward for coming in person to visit him?

Next, you should go to the pulpit of God's Messenger, on him be peace, imagining you can see the Prophet, on him be peace, ascending it. Picture to yourself his radiant appearance, as if he were there on the pulpit, surrounded by the Emigrants and Helpers, may God be pleased with them, as he urges them in his sermon to be obedient to God, Great and Glorious is He. Ask God, Great and Glorious is He, not to part you from him at the Resurrection.

Imam al-Ghazali (Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship).
Even Imam al-Nawawi, in his book Kitab al-Adhkar, had emphasized the benefits of visiting the Prophet's grave. It's too bad the book has been tampered with, and I'm not simply making this up.

19 October 2006

Reviving The Islamic Spirit 5th Annual Convention

"Reviving the Islamic Spirit" convention is an attempt by the youth to help overcome new challenges of communication and integration. The convention aims to promote stronger ties within the North American Society through reviving the Islamic tradition of education, tolerance and introspection, and across cultural lines through points of commonality and respect.

Furthermore, the convention will be a celebration of our identity and Islamic faith. To help attain these ideals, the convention will feature a wide range of voices from various parts of the world.

This convention is not organized by any organization and does not engage in any ideological discourse. It showcases Islamic leadership from across the globe sharing a common platform before the widest cross section of our community. This program hopes to empower the youth across North America and inspire a true revival.
The next convention will be held from 22 to 28 December 2006. Speakers will include:

Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah
Habib Ali Al'Jifri
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf
Imam Zaid Shakir
Dr. Tariq Ramadan
Robert Fisk

More details here.

18 October 2006

Mu'tazilla is not Godzilla

There is no doubt that the Islamic concept of God during the time of Prophet Muhammad was stark and simple. There is one God, and He is like no other. The divine unity is known as Tawhid and it is reinforced by the first part of the Shahada (testimony of faith): There is no God but The God.

This was when Islam was essentially confined to the Arabian peninsula, whose inhabitants had an unsophisticated notion of religion. The simplicity of faith had been molded by centuries of living in harsh, arid climes where life and death was separated only by a thin line. Some would argue that it was this quality that made the first Arab converts so comfortable in their roles as the initial heralds of the the Islamic revelation, for the religion quickly expanded in all directions, eventually brushing up against ancient civilizations like Persia and Rome.

Non-Arab Muslims flocked to Islam in droves, and brought with them their own cultures and intellectual heritage which were often more highly-developed and systemized than the Arabs' own. It was inevitable that these new converts would understand Islam in the light of their own traditions. Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zahra (1898-1974) identified it as a person's involuntary inclination towards the past; a sub-conscious trait that found the strongest expression during the bloody civil wars of Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib's (599-661) reign. Ancient sects and mysteries stirred to life, adding to the chaos that threatened to tear the fledgling Muslim community apart. It was in the midst of this jumble of confused ideas and sects that the Mu'tazilites made their appearance.

Mu'tazilism was a doctrinal stream dedicated to refuting the more obvious heresies of its time. It was because of their work that the rulers of the Abbassid dynasty (750-1258) gave them their staunch support. According to Abul-Hasan al-Khayyat in al-Intisar, a Mu'tazilite adhered to five core tenets:

1. Tawhid
2. Justice
3. The Promise and the Threat
4. The Position between the Two Positions, and
5. Commanding the right while forbidding the wrong.
Each tenet was crafted to respond to a particular heretical group that the Mu'tazilites confronted. Their doctrine of Tawhid, for example, was formulated to refute the anthropomorphist, who interpreted the scriptures in an overly-literal way and sought to assign human qualities and even limbs to God. The tenet of Justice was to refute the Jabarite school, which taught that man is compelled in his actions without any power, volition or choice. The Promise and the Threat was used to refute the Murijites (deferrers), who claimed that God would forgive all sins except disbelief and that hell was only a temporary abode. The Position between the Two Positions was in direct response to the Kharajites (seceders), who insisted that anyone who sinned was immediately an unbeliever, his life and property forfeit.

Despite their efforts, the Mu'tazilites were strongly opposed by scholars who were steeped in orthodox teaching of Islam. This was because the Mu'tazilite defense of Islam included many aspects of the theological and logical devices of their opponents. These tools came to be collectively known as kalam, and it was this particular manifestation of it that provoked both Imam Shafi'i and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal to condemn the science. In Imam Shafi'i's eyes, kalam encouraged division and strife, as is evident from his statements:
"I see that some of the people of kalam call others unbelievers, while the people of hadith call others mistaken. Mistakes are far less grave than disbelief."

"If you debate a matter of fiqh people say- 'You have erred,' not "You have committed kufr'."
Imam Shafi'i keenly objected to the way in which some Muslims used kalam to come up with absolute answers on Islamic doctrine, even as they ignored the fact that some of the philosophical devices had been borrowed from backgrounds that were incompatible with Islam. This was especially true for the Mu'tazilites, who relied more on reason than transmission. Every question was put through a sieve of logic. What was logical was accepted. What was illogical was rejected. Whatever was unclear was dealt with by linguistic means.

While knowledge generally has a positive quality, not all is useful in religious application. Imam Shafi'i diligently shunned the practice of borrowing the kalam of philosophers, and restricted himself to exploring only those aspects of kalam that addressed ingrained Islamic doctrine. When asked about the evidence that Muhammad was the Messenger of God, for example, he replied:
"The proof of the Prophethood of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the revealed Quran, the consensus of the people and the signs that cannot be attributed to any but him."
Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zahra lists other traits that the Mu'tazilites possessed:
1. They avoided imitation  and were averse to following others without investigation, examination and comparison proofs and criteria. Hence, they did not imitate one another; the rule they followed was that every responsible person is answerable for the principles of the Deen (religion) to which his ijtihad (the scholarly effort to derive rules from the Quran and hadiths) leads him. This was primarily why they split into so many groups, each with its own ideological bias.

2. Their respect was reserved for opinions and not for names, for what they perceived as the truth and not the speaker.

3. They relied on the intellect to establish articles of faith, finding support for their positions from the Quran. They lacked knowledge of hadiths because they did not use them for either doctrine or evidence.

4. They took from scientific sources that were translated in their time, borrowing generously from them to buttress their arguments against their opponents.
In Sunni Islam, Mu'tazilism effectively died as a distinct movement, after being replaced by the more orthodox doctrinal schools of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873-935) and Imam Abu Mansur Al Maturidi (d. 944). However, like genocidal Kharajism, many of Mu'tazilism's traits have been revived in modern Islamic movements. Elements of the Mu'tazilite dialectic can be found in the writings of modern Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, also known as the father of the Salafist reform movement, is particularly interesting because his early education was deeply anchored in the Shia understanding of Islam. His writings, most notably The Benefits of Philosophy, mimic the Mu'tazilite fondness for articulating a cosmology based on the findings of modern science.

The revival of what are really ancient tendencies within the Islamic fold is not an unexpected development, given the unfortunate return of anarchic conditions to the Muslim community these days. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States report might seem like an odd and unfair source of information on the Islamic world, but it accurately identifies today's global violence as being "byproducts of an Arab civil war".

One of the main reasons Mu'tazilism fell out of the Sunni framework of religion was the liberties it took with interpreting Islam. Many with heretical opinions found Mu'tazilism to be a nest in which to incubate their ideas. This was due to the inherent flexibility of Mu'tazilism's deductive methods, a symptom that is also present in today's extremist groups. In many instances, the positions adopted by contemporary extremists on questions of jihad, women and non-Muslims repudiate that of traditional scholarship. Extremists typically abandon established and rigorously-transmitted solutions in favor of solutions that are creative and radical enough to bolster their agenda. Not surprisingly, some of the ulema (scholars) they quote from are also likely to be highly-controversial figures who lived in near-contemporary times. It is this predisposition that led John Gray to dub extremist groups as being the offspring of modernism.

It is conceivable that in the Mu'tazilite paradigm, philosophical and ideological bias ingratiate themselves into it from very early on, which would in turn lead to the splintering of the community along contentious, absolute factions. I personally believe that the Islamic world has so far been spared the fate of religions like Christianity and Judaism (and their splintering into hundreds of sects and devolvement into personal spheres of life) because those Muslims who subscribe to Mu'tazilite ideals continue to be in the minority, with little or no influence over Islam's eventual destiny.

16 October 2006

The real response to Pope Benedict

Thirty eight leading Muslim scholars and leaders have signed a joint open letter to the Pope in the spirit of goodwill to respond to the remarks made by His Holiness on 12 September 2006.

All the eight schools of thought and jurisprudence in Islam are represented by the signatories, including a woman scholar. In this respect the letter is unique in the history of interfaith relations. The signatories include:

Shaykh Muhammad Said Ramadan Bouti (Syria),
Shaykh Mustafa Ceric (Bosnia and Herzegovina),
Shaykh Ali Mashhour (Tarim, Yemen),
Shaykh Umar bin Hafeeth (Tarim, Yemen),
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf (USA),
Prof Omar Jah (Gambia),
Shaykh Ali Zain al-Abideen al-Jifri (UAE),
Shaykh Ali Jum'a (Egypt),
Prof Muhammad Hashem Kamali (Malaysia),
Shaykh Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Jordan),
Shaykh Ahmad Hasyem Muzadi (Indonesia),
Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr (USA),
Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Taskhiri (Iran),
Mufti Taqi Uthmani (Pakistan),
Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad (UK)

Click here to go to ISLAMICA Magazine's website to read the full letter.

Hat-tip to the Reading Sanctuary for this.

14 October 2006

New podcasts- Shaykh Hamza Yusuf and Imam Zaid Shakir

Hamza Yusuf - Achieving Balance in a Troubled World

Imam Zaid Shakir - Balancing Between Faith, Family & Community

You might subscribe to these illuminating lectures through Podcasts regularly featured at Alhambra Productions.

08 October 2006

The Great Commission of Mussulman

Over the years, I have been struck by the contradiction between what I read in Salafi materials and what I hear from the lips of Salafist practioners. Two very different forms of Salafism emerges from either channel. For example, Salafist websites are famous for their "hit lists" of groups and individuals whom they consider deviants. Depending on how far down the Salafist ladder a particular website is, these lists typically include Shaykhs Hamzah Yusuf, Nuh Ha Mim Keller and Hakim Murad. The triad is always good for a game of "us-versus-them"; or to be more specific, true Islam versus charlatan Islam. It's all very tribal, you see.

Most Salafists, however, don't carry these lists in their heads. People are essentially good, trusting creatures, and they don't go around labeling other Muslims as either "deviants" or "innovators". The last is especially ironic since Salafists are one of the only type of Muslims who think all innovations, including the ubiquitous prayer beads, are evil.

Now, Salafism is of course larger than all these petty concerns. It is an industry more inclined toward prostelyzing amongst Muslims. In fact, it would not be too far-fetched to say that Salafism's main concern has always been fellow Muslims. Since one of Salafism's favorite names for itself is the Saved Sect, it's quite reasonable to conclude that those outside Salafism aren't too saved, and that Salafism, or what the Saudi Shaykh Muhammad Naasiruddeen al-Albaani calls the Salafi Madhhab, is the only true path to salvation.

But the ordinary Salafist will tell you that the other Madhhabs like Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi'ie and Hanbali are legit too. They will say that while these four classical Madhhabs (juristic schools of thought) are sources of fiqh (the science of Islamic jurisprudence), the Salafi Madhhab is an exclusive source of aqida (Islamic doctrine or belief). They view theologians like Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari, for example, as having promulgated a flawed understanding of God.

Considering that the great bulk of Muslim institutions and education centers in Southeast Asia still hold Ashari'ism to be a valid theology, it's easy to see how a writer like Mr Abdul-Rahman Bin Hamad Al-Omer came up with this equation:

"Muslims are many in number but few in reality, and the groups that claim to be Muslim are many, approaching 73 sects and numbering more than 1 billion."
One billion Muslims out of 1.3 billion isn't such a bad statistic. It still leaves three hundred million rapturous Muslims in the clear.

Yet, it's merely a statement of purpose. The Christians have their Great Commission, and Muslims- a small subset of them, certainly- possess the above testimony. Like most testimonies though, it's open to interpretation. In Salafism's case, the problem of mis-interpretation is particularly acute. The proof is in the amazingly consistent way such a creed shapes the outlook of modern extremist groups, which is hardly surprising since Salafism is itself a relatively modern enterprise. More importantly, it shares with Zionism the distinction of being an ideology that only became popular due to European ascendancy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

I am not saying that extremist groups are the true ambassadors of Salafism, but there is no doubt that Salafism's core tenets prove extremely inviting to extremists. The recently-killed Musab al-Zarqawi called himself a Salafist. Bloodthirsty Algerian separatists call themselves Salafists. Jemaah Islammiyyah, operating in Indonesia, claims to be Salafist. It is therefore inaccurate to say that violence is the result of an extreme interpretation of Islam when it really is the inevitable result of extreme ideology. An ordinary Muslim practicing Islam puritanically might be said to resemble an Amish, holding conservative views on a wide range of social issues and living out a closeted lifestyle. Hence, more women donning the niqab (face veil) should never be taken as evidence of radicalism. It reflects a more fundamental alignment with the religion's goals, certainly, but not with militant ideologies. Extreme Salafism, on the other hand, is revolutionary from the outset, inclined toward action to set things aright. Armed with the "Muslims are many in number but few in reality" manifesto, these groups, though beginning their career as "freedom-fighters" invariably plunge into the grisly business of fratricide.

Geographically and ethnically diverse, it is striking how these groups differ very little from each other, especially in their tactics and even the ulema (scholars) they quote from to justify their actions. They express absolutely no remorse at killing fellow Muslims, for example. In most cases, the targeting of Muslims seem almost deliberate. The same pattern is replicated everywhere these groups and their militant  ideology penetrate. From the "Wahhabi" inspired rebellion in Sumatra that left many traditional Muslims dead, to the Algerian secession that has seen the worst kinds of slaughter. All of them degenerated into civil wars involving the massacre of thousands of Muslims at the hands of militants.

All the while, the mainstream media has proven itself totally inapt at reporting the phenomenon, in its lazy dismissal that such wars are rooted in ethnicity. The laziness is apparent in Darfur, for example. The mainstream media finds it almost impossible to rise above its habit of partitioning the world in boundaries it is familiar with, little acknowledging the fact that racial wars are a rarity in the Islamic world. Perhaps it serves their agenda of lumping Muslims as a single people, with hardly a dissenting voice on the violence wrought by militants. What I really think, though, is that these reporters lack the necessary knowledge in both Islam and history to "read between the lines".

In the end, all they have to do really is to study the manner in which the victims of such civil wars practice their Islam. Are they part of the one billion who practice wrong Islam, or part of the three hundred million who adhere to correct Islam?

03 October 2006

If Rice could fly

Once again, America is barking up the wrong tree. US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice has stated that one of the main aims of her tour of the Middle East is to fire up moderate Muslims in the region.

"We are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all the people."
Her words are ironic, considering that two of her more significant pitstops are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I may be wrong, but that's probably why the democratic line is being liberally coated in fluff and spin. Instead, she emphasizes more on forces of moderation, a label into which Saudi Arabia and Egypt might be dropped into without uncomfortable questions being asked.

Rice knows, of course, that if the popular vote is ever served in those two contries, Israel's place in that part of the world would hang in a precarious balance. Hamas' totally expected win in Palestinian elections is a case in point.

America might be the global evangelist for freedom and liberties, but when it comes to the Middle East, the carrot that is democracy attracts some rather unsavory characters. Successive US administrations have tolerated political repression in those countries because its mechanisms also help crack down on extremists who are anti-western by default.

What Rice fails to understand in a spectacular fashion is that places like Saudi Arabia are moderate only insomuch as they serve American geo-political interests. I think it is extremely unlikely, for example, to find even the most indifferent Arab Muslim siding with Israel's continued occupation over large and fertile portions of the West Bank. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been too long-drawn and painful for anyone to carry an objective view of things. The land has become this generation's new idol for monotheists who pride themselves over their uncompromising belief in one God.

But that does not even begin to address the perennial blister that is Iran. The US' continued appeasement of Saudi Arabia, in spite of the vicious anti-western rhetoric coming out from the kingdom's pulpits, must be seen against the context of the version of Islam that dominates not only the regime's religious authorities, but also extremist groups the world over.

Such groups nurture a habit of intense hatred against all Shia. The hostility is a strategic asset that is useful at a time when Iran- the center of the Shi'i sect- appears to be in ascendant form. Worse, Israel's foolish adventure into Lebanon has only managed to enhance Iran's prestige. What better counterweight is there than to enlist the ideological aid of another group that already demonizes the Shi'ias?

It seems that the US has not entirely shaken off its penchant for interfering in the Middle East, pitting one so-called tribe against the other, so that its wider interests of ensuring a cheap supply of oil continues to be served. In this, George Bush broke his promise never again to appease Arab dictators.

While the US rightly fears an arms-race developing in that volatile region, it should perhaps first revise its inconsistent policy on Israel's own formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, attempting to exploit a particular brand of Islam that totally opposes Shi'ism is short-sighted and possibly destructive, especially since the government that is emerging in Iraq shares with Iran the "unfortunate" distinction of being predominantly Shia.

Did the US not cultivate the same kind of "force" in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion? Did the al-Qaida not rise from the ashes of that force?

Stop choosing the easy way out, Rice.