Get thee behind me, Madhhab!

There is no current of thought more tragic than the one that says fiqh, or the science of Islamic jurisprudence, is easy. Unfortunately, the idea has gained momentum amongst Muslims, who typically dismiss the notion that in order to master the science, one has to immerse himself in deep study for a number of years and emerge an accredited professional. For a word that literally means "understanding", fiqh is certainly a misunderstood science. It has become a cheap commodity in the marketplace of Islamic ideas, facilitated by online forums where participants debate by quoting directly from both Koran and hadiths (transmitted reports on the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) to prove or disprove one another's positions. If a profession is this easy to master, any man or woman could dole out medical advise by having in their hands a book on common ailments and a compendium of all the drugs that have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). It's a simple matter of cross-referencing sicknesses and medicines. Or is it?

Part of the problem is how superficially (and negatively) Muslims view Madhhabs (schools of thought), from which an epic amount of fiqh rulings emanate. To accuse Muslims of having a superficial understanding of a particular aspect of Islam is of course different from the common ideological view that Muslims are practicing Islam wrongly. The latter has its roots in simple sectarianism, which in turn is fueled by the narcissistic need of all ideological movements to make themselves an exclusive club.

I would instead argue that Muslims today have too much information, but not enough tools to properly interpret, qualify and quantify it. Fiqh, in its most most basic sense, is the science of how rulings are derived from the valid sources of Islamic law, namely, the Koran, the Sunnah (the actions and practices of the Prophet Muhammad), the consensus of scholars (ijma) and analogical deduction (qiyas). Traditionally, it has been scholars aligning themselves to either one of four Madhhabs who have perused the sacred literature and attempted to develop laws from them.

However, three factors have conspired to foster a dramatic reversal. First, the burgeoning literacy amongst Muslims. Second, the enormous explosion in the printing of the Koran and hadiths. Third, the wide range of languages into which these primary sources have been translated.

All three factors in turn promote the belief that an individual has reached, or at least is in the vicinity of, a pinnacle of knowledge. If all this sounds suspiciously like the Enlightenment ideas of eighteenth-century Europe, you wouldn't be that far off the track. Almost the entire Islamic world was once fair game for European colonialist ambitions, whose expansion came in the wake of policies that subjugated people, exploited natural resources and shattered unity. British colonial administrators were shrewd enough to focus on a critical pillar of society, namely education. Thus, one of the first things they did when they conquered a Muslim country was to supplant traditional Islamic education with one that had a western empirical bias. Colonized Muslims learnt from very early on that in order to obtain the best salaries, they had to get themselves employed by the civil service, and the only way to attain that was through schools run with an European setup.

More decisive than the three factors was perhaps the personality that was formed by the European schools. The mind lost its elasticity to think in in the vertical plane, directing itself toward more logical and discursive modes of thought. Instead of looking at physical phenomenon imaginatively, Muslims began to strip an object of all its emotive associations and concentrate on the thing itself. The legitimacy of traditional practices like visiting the Prophet's grave in Medina, for example, began to be questioned, by some groups more than others. On hindsight, it is easy to see how such an environment had been fully anticipated by the colonial agenda. It is therefore no coincidence that the discrediting of Madhhabs and its traditions began in earnest at precisely the same point in time.

The main grouse was not aimed at Madhhabs per se, but the devotion that almost all Muslims had for their respective Madhhabs. Like Zionism was to Orthodox Judaism, this grouse at first belonged to a fringe group that was largely dismissed by the majority. As it became clearer that the traditionalists were unable to deal effectively with modernity's onslaught, the fringe group grew in size and influence. Historical factors were beginning to stack up against the normative practice of Islam transmitted through the Four Schools.

Get thee behind me, Madhhab!
The call to abandon adherence to the Four Schools and instead return to the very sources of Islam is as simple as it is egalitarian. Its defenders do not explicitly disparage the Imams who founded the Madhhabs, but highlight the rhetorical fact they had merely been human beings prone to error. They like to quote the sayings of these Imams which went along the lines of, "If you find a hadith that contradicts my ruling, discard my ruling and follow the better hadith." They also conclude that since Imams Malik, Abu Hanifa, Shafi'ie and Ahmad Hanbal had all formed their schools long after the deaths of the Prophet Muhammad and the al-salaf al-salihin (Pious Predecessors), the potential for error is compounded. Naturally, true religion is to be found from the primary sources and not mere mortals, regardless of their outstanding character, faith and intelligence.

I shall pause here to examine the logic of these arguments, a package I normally call the "prime shakedown" because of its sheer universality amongst anti-Madhhab groups.

Firstly, the rhetorical device that is found in bringing up the Imams' human credentials (and its alleged propensity to err) is itself erroneous. The Madhhabs do not consist of the opinions of only one man, no matter how sterling his reputation and scholarship. Again, I hold up the superficiality of knowledge amongst Muslims as being the chief instigator of this device. Just because a particular Madhhab like Hanbal's is named after an individual Imam named Ahmad Hanbal does not mean Ahmad Hanbal is the exclusive source of all that Madhhab's wisdom. He was not even the first one to codify a set of rules, collectively and more accurately called a methodology, to approach the primary sources. What he did was gather and refine the best methods of his time into a framework that would be internally stable and transparent.

It is in this way that the four Madhhabs is said to exist in an unbroken chain to their origins for more than a thousand years, right up the Prophet himself. The scholars within each Madhhab thus number in the millions.

Naturally, to accuse a particular Madhhab of erring is really to accuse millions of scholars of erring. The implications are of course really quite horrifying and resembles somewhat the debates that early Christian scholars had on the status of men and women who were born before Jesus' apparent crucifixion. Were they saved or not? Entire nations of people would theologically belong in hell if the matter was taken to its logical conclusion.

But the principle of finding a kind of orthodoxy in what the majority believes in was established from very early on. Shaykh Rabi'a, who was Imam Malik's teacher, best summarized the principle in a comment he made on his famous student's method of using the practices of the people of Medina as sources of fiqh rulings,

"A thousand from a thousand is better than one from one."

What you see is what you get (WSIWYG)
This brings us quite nicely to the second facet of the "prime shakedown", which is the implication that Madhhabs occasionally throw up wrong rulings. Putting aside the question of whether such and such a ruling is right or wrong, the logic behind such an implication deserves some scrutiny.

Fiqh rulings are but a tiny part of what makes up a Madhhab. More substantial and ironically more concealed are the methodologies used in deriving rulings. Too often, defenders of the "prime shakedown" pronounce a judgment of "false" or "wrong" on a particular ruling without first saying what is wrong about the methodology that produced the ruling. Since Madhhabs are primarily methodologies, it is more correct to refute the methodology behind the allegedly problematic ruling. After which, rather than swap rulings, proffer a better methodology.

Needless to say, this doesn't happen a lot. Superficiality of knowledge has only intensified the flawed understanding of what a Madhhab really is. If taqleed is defined as "trust in qualified scholarship", then it is not merely a case of 'blindly following' the fatwa, or opinions, coming out of a school, but adhering to the methodology that best avoids innovation in matters of faith. The greatest proof of a Madhhab's ability to stand the rigors of time is its continued use and application through time. In this, more than anything else, nothing comes close to the Madhhabs in preserving the religion in its most pristine condition. Where dynasties and governments have gone, the Four Schools have yet to follow.

Because methodologies differ between schools, it is inevitable that they differ in rulings. What is striking is that this fact is not something that people recently stumbled upon. Differences have always been deemed a source of mercy from God, though this dogma arises from a hadith some scholars have classified as weak. However, a weak hadith does not necessarily mean the Prophet Muhammad did not utter those words. It simply means there is some doubt on either the chain of transmission or the individual quality of the narrators. Needless to say, to differ is human nature. Shaykh Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi (The Differences of the Imams) explains that.

This is one of the reasons why Abu Bakr, in his speech after the death of Allah's Messenger, forbade the people from narrating hadiths, as this would have created differences and contention among the community.

We know that even the al-salaf al-salihin had keen disputes about matters of law. These contentions reached a peak during the lifetimes of many of the Imams who formulated Madhhabs, with only four surviving till this day; that of Imam Malik, Imam Shafi'ie, Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Ahmad Hanbal.

Most orthodox teachers of Madhhabs teach that it is wrong to exploit these differences because of the potential for sectarianism. This is not saying that Madhhabs have never had their fair share of fanatical partisanship, but that it has never been an industry standard in the collective umbrella of Madhhabs known as Ahle-Sunnah-Waal-Jemaah.

Such an attitude must be contrasted with those who denounce judgments on rulings in the most superficial manner possible. At the heart of such denunciations is nothing but a reckless attempt at sectarianism; an exercise that continues to be unanimously condemned by scholars who teach from a Madhhab's framework.

Who were they talking to?
But what of the Four Imams' constant remonstrations not to take their words as law, and the call to abandon any opinion if it contrasts with a strong hadith? This question has several dimensions. Foremost in the misunderstanding of this scholarly injunction is the belief that Madhhabs are simply fatwa, rulings or opinions. The Four Imams had not intended to leave a legacy of fatwa, as evidenced by their reluctance to put their judgments down on paper, or in the case of Imam Malik, to spread his rulings beyond the borders of his hometown of Medina.

It should be noted that their true legacies lie in the methodologies they formulated in any approach to the primary sources of the Koran and hadith. This is to be differentiated from other kinds of approaches to the sacred literature. Ordinary Muslims read the Koran to obtain not only spiritual blessings, but also inspiration and knowledge. Fiqh scholars read it to obtain fiqh rulings. It is an entirely different enterprise and requires its own system of rules through which the scholars determine law. There are apparently contradictory passages in the vast body of hadith, for example, that need to be resolved through laws of abrogation. That means, a scholar must determine which passage 'replaces' the other passage. For such an activity, the scholar must acquaint himself with the historical background into which each phrase was uttered. He must also be completely proficient in the Arabic language of the Koran and also its colloquial forms, including a mastery of idioms and grammar. Yet, what I have mentioned is merely the tip of the iceberg of what any scholar who hopes to obtain fiqh from the primary sources requires. This intellectual effort- known as ijtihad- used to send the Imams into paroxysms of fear and anxiety. They knew that any judgment they make would be adhered to closely by their students and laymen.

Because Madhhabs are truly methodologies and not merely rulings, there is a certain amount of flexibility in the whole discipline. Opinions change, and should change according to the availability of hadith and the exigencies of various times and places. What remains are the methods through which these factors are subjected to, the tests and criteria. So, when the Imams left instructions to abandon a ruling if a strong hadith contradicts it, they could not have addressed it to people with no mastery of the methodologies. Fiqh is a tripartite relationship between Koran, hadith and methodology.

Actually, it has always been clear that the Imams were really admonishing their own students- who would themselves become scholars- not to abandon the quality of open-mindedness so essential to a sincere seeker of knowledge. Renewal arrives by way of an extraordinary custom that discourages any scholar who has reached the level of a mujtahid (those qualified to make ijtihad) to rely on Madhhabs and instead make his own judgments from the primary sources of the Koran and hadiths himself. However, the fact that towering intellects like Imam Nawawi and Imam Ghazali, who came far after the four Imams, chose to adhere to a Madhhab instead of forming schools of their own suggests that the mantle of the mujtahid is heavy and not often sought after.

A question of age
The last argument that defenders of the "prime shakedown" employ is that Madhhabs came long after the time of the Prophet, and consequently, should not be adhered to in place of the Prophet or the al-salaf-al-salih. The line of reasoning is disingenuous simply because of how many false things it presumes. It indirectly implies, for example, that the scholars of Madhhabs do not receive their religion from the Prophet himself, but from the Four Imams. If we take it a step further, we might even speculate on whether the Four Imams had actually based their whole corpus of rulings entirely on what is found in the Koran and the Sunnah. Again, this device can be traced to the superficial understanding that Madhhabs are just opinions. The device works because it is easy to argue that the Prophet's opinions far outweigh the Four Imams.

Nonetheless, it is predicated on a flawed understanding of Madhhabs. It simply belies all bounds of rationality to say that one has an exclusive conduit to the Prophet and the salaf-al-salih based on an outward rejection of first, a conscious adherence to a Madhhab; and second, the claim that one takes his religion instead from a direct approach to the sacred sources. Why? Because there is no such thing as a direct approach. Which is why labels like Salafi (those who claim to be following the path of the salaf-al-salih) hold no real meaning. There can be no objective reality to calling oneself a Salafi unless it is applied on all Muslims. If however there is a willful attempt to portray both the founders and the scholars of Madhhabs as somehow not being particularly zealous about receiving their knowledge from the salaf-al-salih, then the word Salafi in its cultish sense would hold true.

Nonetheless, I have always found it amusing that Muslims would find the term "Mohammedan" offensive yet accept gladly to be called a "Salafi".

Religion is essentially interpretative, even for those who are not content with just calling themselves Muslims. There can be no purpose in any framework that claims to represent most accurately the views and actions of the Prophet and his Companions without first offering an interpretative methodology.

Farid Esack (The Quran: Liberation and Pluralism) argues that,

A commonly supposed pre-suppositionless or innocent approach to understanding the Quran has no basis in the history of Tafsir or 'ulum al-Quran for all non-Prophetic human experience is essentially interpretative and mediated by culture and personality- factors which cannot be transcended...

Obviously, one of the most important criterion that the methodology must fulfill is consistency.

Consistency is something that most modern groups who operate outside the Madhhabs consistently fail in. This is unsurprising since religion is as much interpretative for the Salafis as it is for the scholar who operates within a Madhhab. The often bitter rivalry between groups who claim themselves to be Salafist in outlook, for example, presents the most elegant defense for the existence of a methodology, and also for it to be internally consistent. In fact, the Salafist bickering is entirely reminiscent of the chaotic era before the Four Imams formulated their schools. It is striking that the Kharajite movement, a secessionist cult that saw themselves as true Muslims and others as false, flourished then as it does now in some respects.

It bears repeating that superficiality of knowledge is one of the most dangerous threats facing the Muslim community today. It endorses a reductionist form of Islam that inevitably takes on a predominantly literalist flavor. How else can a superficial mind deal with the primary sources without a coherent methodology but to reach simple solutions?

Olivier Roy (Globalised Islam) notes that such an attitude typically,

...discards philosophy, literature, Sufism and any sort of sophisticated theology. The scripuralist approach (which says that one must adhere to the word of the Koran and Sunnah) by definition nullifies centuries of interpretation and debates. It justifies the de facto shrinking of religious knowledge in relation to secular knowledge and relegating it to the purely technical sphere. Hence, in order to specialise in the religious sciences, religious schools have abandoned wider learning and left it entirely to secular schools...religious knowledge is based on a technical approach to religion (dos and don'ts) that presents ibadat and fiqh as a sort of code, not based on values and spirituality.

In a very real way, Madhhabs have been too successful for their own good. Not only did they manage to preserve the core tenets of the religion through rigorous methodologies, they have also fostered a unity amongst Muslims that is seldom seen outside Islam. Sectarianism was the exception rather than the rule. Religious inquisition was seldom imposed, with Madhhabs making the religion almost self-regulatory. Madhhabs made the Muslim world into such a coherent and easily-governed force that empires and governments have constantly tried to break down the walls separating the scholars- who traditionally depended on waqf (charitable) stipends- from political concerns. They also became, ironically enough, the first things to go when European powers took control of much of the Muslim world from the eighteenth century onwards. The colonialist agenda is complete in the splintering of the Muslim community. More insidious, perhaps, is the loss of spiritual direction of many of the youths living in ghettos of both Muslim and non-Muslim lands. The consistency and personal stability offered by Madhhabs were taken away, but Muslims today are continually instructed to look for answers elsewhere. Let old ghosts die, they are told. This is where suicidal ideologies like al-Qaida's- breaking almost every single statute of the once self-regulating religion- come into the picture.

In spite of not possessing a central clergy like the Catholic Church, Madhhabs have preserved the ideal of ahle-sunnah-waal-jemaah through their acceptance of diversity. This feature is also its greatest weakness, as far as ideological attacks are concerned. The innate openness of the Madhhabs provide ideologues who want to undermine the position and authority of the Madhhabs with a rather unimaginative weapon. I say unimaginative because it does not take a genius to figure out the apparent "contradiction" of the Madhhabs' position with regards to other Madhhabs, best encapsulated in the question, "...if this ruling on prayer from Imam Shafie is correct, how can the ruling from Imam Abu Hanifa also be correct?"

It is this fact that defenders of the "prime shakedown" constantly harp on. I discussed this charge in a previous post, but no answer can either be complete or satisfactory without examining precisely how the Four Imams derived their opinions from the primary sources, especially from the vast collections of hadiths and the manner in which their chains of transmissions were evaluated. I will deal with this matter in a later article and leave you instead with a story about Imam Abu Hanifa, which helps throw light on the single-most important feature of his methodology, and how easy it is to misunderstand the intentions of even the most brilliant of scholars.

Imam Abu Hanifa explains himself
Imam Abu Hanifa lived in the city of Kufa in Iraq, known as one of the two principal sources of fiqh in the Islamic world; the other being Medina. Because he was surrounded by Muslims from the Shia persuasion, he had a special affection for the family of the Prophet Muhammad, known as the ahle-bayt. One of these was Muhammad al-Baqir, whom Imam Abu Hanifa once met in Medina.

It is reported that al-Baqir remarked to him, "Are you the one who changes the deen of my grandfather and his hadiths by analogy?" Abu Hanifa replied, "I seek refuge with Allah!"

Muhammad (al-Baqir) said, "You have changed it. Abu Hanifa said, "Sit in your place as is your right until I sit by my right. I respect you as your grandfather, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was respected by his Companions when he was alive." He sat.

Then Abu Hanifa knelt before him and said, "I will present you with three things to answer. Who is weaker: a man of woman?"

"A woman," he (al-Baqir) replied. Abu Hanifa then asked; "What is the share of a woman?"

"A man has two shares and a woman one," he replied. Abu Hanifa said, "This is the statement of your grandfather. If I had changed the deen of your grandfather, by analogy a man would have one share and a woman two because the woman is weaker than the man."

Then he asked, "Which is better: the prayer or fasting?" "The prayer," al-Baqir replied. He said, "This is the statement of your grandfather. If I had changed the deen of your grandfather, my analogy would be that, because the prayer is better, when a woman is free of menstruation she should be commanded to make up the prayer and not make up the fast."

Then he asked, "Which is more impure: urine or sperm?" "Urine is more impure," he replied. He said, "If I had changed the deen of your grandfather by analogy, I would have ordered a ghusl for urine and wudu' for sperm. I seek refuge with Allah from changing the deen of your grandfather by analogy." Muhammad rose and embraced him and kissed his face to honour him.

[source: The Four Imams, by Muhammad Abu Zahra]

Hamza Yusuf - The Burda Insight

Hamza Yusuf provides an insight into The Burda by Imam al-Busiri. The Burda is arguably the greatest classic poem in the Arabic language in praise of the character and exalted rank of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him). Composed by Imam al-Busiri in the 13th century CE it has been recited ever since throughout the Muslim lands from East to West and North to South, and has always been perceived as containing real benefits, blessings and miracles. [Alhambra Productions Podcasts]

The audio file (mp3) can be downloaded from here.

You might subscribe to these illuminating lectures through their Podcasts at Alhambra Productions.

Jon Stewart and Israel's strategy

The tireless Jon Stewart breaks down Israel's strategy in Lebanon for the unwashed masses.

View the video clip.

Beatnick Sufis have called it quits

I wonder if anybody noticed, but one of my favorite blogs has gone offline. Know what happened?

Weblog updates

There are some changes to my weblog that might or might not be that noticable. First off, I have removed the Categories feature because it served no practical purpose. I know that's the case because I see virtually no referrals from the del.icio.us site that runs the categories.

More useful are the 'tags' attached to the bottom of every post, preceded by the words, "Filed in". I can't do completely without tags since they contribute significantly to the traffic flowing this way, through tag-munching search engines as Technorati. Funnily enough, the most popular tag associated with Higher Criticism is...**wait for the drumroll**...Salafism.

Second thing I changed, or added rather, is a Trackback feature. I realize that I arrive rather late on the Trackback scene, but I had never been convinced about its usefulness. That is, until people started quoting my posts. I must add that though this happens only very rarely, I am extremely flattered when it happens.

So, if you want to reference a particular entry in Higher Criticism, I would appreciate it greatly if you inform me by pinging a special URL address. Each post has a special URL, easily discovered by clicking on the link that's called Trackback. How do you send a ping my way? I'm glad you asked.

The third thing I added is the random quote feature, tucked into the top righthand corner of this cluttered blog. My favorite quotation happens to come from Shaykh ibn Baaz, whose liberal use of the "dar-ber-lieu" word belies the oft-repeated but ultimately false allegation that it is a mythical term.

...the creed of the Wahhabiyya is based upon fulfillment of witnessing that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allaah and completely abandoning all innovations, superstitions and whatever goes against the Sharee'ah.

[source: http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:
viS2snVTovcJ:www.theclearpath.com/viewtopic.php]

Muslims give blood to Hindu victims

Indian Muslims queued for hours on Wednesday to give blood to their Hindu neighbours wounded in the Mumbai train bombings, in a rare show of harmony in a city with a long history of communal bloodshed.

"We don't care whether it's a Hindu or a Muslim who gets our blood as long as we can save them," said Abdul Khan, one of dozens of Muslim men waiting in line at the blood bank at Siddarth Hospital, near one blast site at Jogeshwari station.

More at Dawn.

Logic of hate might doom Gilad

Israeli children allowed to scribble taunts on artillery shells bound for Lebanon. (courtesy of AP Photo/Sebastian Scheiner)

The Israeli soldiers captured by militants are not coming back alive. Politically, they serve as too useful an excuse for Israel to grind two of its deadliest enemies, Hamas and Hezbollah, into dust. I say deadliest because unlike ordinary Arab governments, the militants have managed to inflict real damage on the pariah of the Middle East. Pariah from the Arab perspective, of course.

Consider that the suicide bombers of these groups are more lethal than any standing army controlled by any Arab government. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have American hardware to match Israel's, but they aren't about to betray American interests by attacking America's favorite democracy. Israel is safe from them for the moment, content that all they are dealing with are poorly-made Qassams and woefully inaccurate Katyusha rockets. Katyusha-s have enjoyed a degree of success only because Hezbollah launch them with such punishing regularity and in swarms toward Israeli cities.

Where the rockets have struck, they have either killed, maimed or terrorized. And because Hamas and Hezbollah field militants rather than uniformed soldiers, Israel is constrained in its response. It has not, for example, launched a 'scorched-earth' policy that was used by the Americans and British against German cities in World War 2.

Yet, there is little doubt that the Israelis are inflicting collective punishment on people who have nothing to do with the kidnappings in Gaza and Lebanon. It irrationally holds the Lebanese government responsible for the actions of a militant movement it neither has power over, nor influence. Israeli shells have hit critical civilian infrastructure like bridges, shipping docks and even the international airport. In Gaza, the added destruction of the only power station has made everyday life difficult and medical aid almost impossible.

Israeli targets all across Lebanon clearly reflect their belief that the Hezbollah are nothing but a proxy army for external parties like Syria and Iran. While the escalation has directly granted Iran some respite from international scrutiny over its nuclear ambitions, the United States holds Syria to be the main puppetmaster behind Hezbollah, as revealed by George Bush in an unguarded moment.

"The irony is, what they really need to do is to get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit, and it's over..."

By targeting major byways, Israel seeks to stifle the import of weapons and ammunition from outside. But since the Israeli withdrawal from a 22-year occupation of Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah has never relinquished its state of battle-readiness. Crude watchtowers built along the border between South Lebanon and Israel speak of a group that knows all too well the value of closely monitoring its enemy. Even before the deadly ambush that killed eight Israeli soldiers and captured two, Katyusha launchpads had been carefully spread out across Hezbollah strongholds.

Civilian casualties have been high in Lebanon compared to Gaza primarily because Israel has limited intelligence assets on Lebanese territory. Furthermore, there seems to be a willful attempt by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to target communities instead of the movement itself. For the past two years Lebanon has been divided into pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian camps, with the split culminating in the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the subsequent departure of Syrian soldiers from Beirut. The anti-Syrian camp is a fragile alliance of Christians, Sunnis and Druze. Syrian allies include the two main Shia groups, Hezbollah and Amal. The Shia form about forty percent of the Lebanese population. It is therefore unsurprising that entire towns have been warned to empty out hours before air and artillery bombardments.

Israel reasons that it must act in an overwhelming manner if it wants to prevent further kidnappings in the future. While such thinking is sound military doctrine, it ignores the fact that the present conflict is grounded in several root causes, chief of which is Israel's refusal to abide by international law in leaving the Occupied Territories and allow a contiguous Palestinian state to come into being. Israel speaks blithely of Palestinian groups like Hamas desiring to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, but does little to acknowledge that its present policy of undermining Palestinian statehood by controlling its air and sea space (and hence, economy), attempting to assassinate democratically-elected government officials and the sometimes deliberate targeting of civilian lives and property has exactly the same effect on Palestinians. Both sides justify genocide on the genocidal tendencies of the other.

The media mill has made the most of this present conflict to provide a workable but typically flawed background to the whole Middle East crisis. The question is, how far back should the context go? The Israelis say it began with the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit, but Hamas counters by calling the kidnapping a retaliation of careless Israeli shelling of Palestinian civilians. Whatever the case, most mainstream media only go as far back as the Israeli version, which in my humble opinion, is a crass miscarriage of journalistic integrity. Undoubtedly, both the Palestinians and Israelis have been criminal in their actions, but covering up one side of the story only means that the other side has a freer reign to kill those it regards as enemies.

Even though Israeli commanders take far greater pains to avoid killing civilians than say their American counterparts in Iraq, the IDF's response has been frankly illogical from the outset. Firing shells into the urban centers of Gaza and Lebanon does not harm the militants one bit, and in fact, strengthens the militant's ideological cause. Demolishing civilian infrastructure allows the superbly-organized social services of these militant movements to rebuild them and claim moral credit. Killing innocent children allows the propaganda machine of the militant movements to use their deaths as reasons for savage retaliation, on Israelis who share the same distinction of being not only civilian, but innocent. More dangerously, Israel's relative impunity in territories that have ostensible military forces whose duty is to protect civilian lives and property betray the utter irrelevance of these forces' existence.

The Israelis are fostering an environment where resistance, in the form of radical militancy, becomes the only option. So even though Israel might triumph in this particular battle and leave Hamas and Hezbollah virtually rudderless, it cannot win the overarching war unless it progresses to the natural conclusion that extreme Zionism foists upon the Israeli nation, that is, the total suppression of those who oppose the ideal of a Biblically-promised Greater Israel.

Israel has a running economy, schools, running water that is often taken directly from Palestinian streams, a tourism industry; all the trappings of a developed country which cannot sustain a drawn-out war. The Palestinians can because they have nothing to begin with, and in their minds, are fighting to obtain their rightful share in the world; namely, a state of their own.

Khaled Abou El Fadl in Singapore

All credit to Wardah Books for covering Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl's recent visit to Singapore.

Besides promoting his book, The Great Theft, Professor Khaled also gave an interview to the Straits Times. The contents of the interview are nothing less than fascinating and signals a hopeful direction that Southeast Asian Muslims are charting for themselves. I reproduce it in full below, bolding the parts I feel are important.

"There may need to be sacrificial lambs. I'm going to play this role and speak my conscience."

Dr Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic law at UCLA and Bush appointee to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, is the academic voice of the world's majority moderate Muslims. In an exclusive interview with The Straits Times, he discusses his new book, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From The Extremists, which the Associated Press has called 'the most dramatic manifesto from an American Muslim since the September 11 attacks'.

By John R. Bradley

Senior Writer

.Q. You write in The Great Theft: 'The essential lesson taught by Islamic history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of Islam; they are marginalised, and they eventually come to be treated as a heretical aberration to the Islamic message.' Is there really much cause for hope that the 21st century will follow this pattern?

A. If I think as a scientist and a calculating man and evaluate the data objectively, the tone of my book would not be justified. But if I evaluate it as a Muslim who believes that - as the Quran says - Islam is a message sent as a mercy to humanity, that the ideas that are the main justification of Islam are mercy to humanity and 'peace be upon you', as we consistently repeat, then, as a matter of faith, I believe that if the moderate Muslims pay their dues, God will aid them and we will be victorious.

They just have to get off their lazy posterior, realise the danger and spring into action. This, I believe, is what God expects of them. At least, I believe it is what God expects of me, and this is why I do what I do.

.Q. But why is it so difficult for moderate Muslims such as yourself, who you say represent the silent majority, to speak out against a minority that encourages intolerant acts of violence?

A. In theory, it should not be difficult for moderate Muslims to speak out. Indeed, there are many moderate Muslim writers who write and publish books. But there are two levels of restrictions they face.

The first level is the bar that exists to speaking out. The second, once moderates have managed to speak out, is getting heard. There are a lot of moderate professors who speak about the Islam that is lived by most Muslims in the world, not only an Islam that contributed to the arts and society and humanities, but also an Islam that allows all sorts of societies to exist in which there are - at the micro level and the daily level - human acts of generosity and kindness.

However, once a writer attempts to write about this 'lived' Islam, he must find an outlet. Unfortunately, in the Arabic-speaking world these outlets for moderate, non-Salafi/Wahhabi Muslims have diminished greatly. It used to be the case, for instance, in the 1950s and 1960s that there were publishing outlets in Kuwait, in Lebanon and in Egypt (that gave them a platform).

But what started taking place in the 1970s is that Saudi Arabia commenced on a very concerted and, I would say, a very well thought-out effort to dominate the public discourse on Islam. They did this simply through largesse.

Take, for instance, Dar Al-Risala, a press in Lebanon that published some of the most popular books until the 1980s, a very big and well-known publisher. But in the 1970s it started entering into contracts with the Saudi government, which would buy one thousand copies of each book - and pay in hard currency. In this way, Saudi Arabia attained amazing power over Dar Al-Risala.

When Dar Al-Risala contemplated publishing a book Saudi Arabia disapproved of, the Saudi government would inform the publisher that he would become persona non grata, or the contracts would either diminish or be cancelled altogether. This is just one example of what was repeated again and again.

.Q. Do you not think that there is a danger of simplifying the issue by singling out the Al-Saud ruling family, and by extension the Wahhabism it sponsors, as the root cause of Islamic extremism?

A. It is not the only factor, by far, and my writings emphasise that this is not the only source of fanaticism. But it is the most important. With the help of the British, the Al-Saud dismantled the Caliphate (in the 1920s) and altered in fundamental and material ways the nature of the major holy sites of Islam.

For instance, it used to be the case that in Mecca there were religious structures, usually directed towards the qibla (the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays), that symbolised the different schools of Islamic thought. They existed for the Shafi'is, for the Hanafis, for the Hanbalis and the Malikis. Just as there used to be for the Shi'ite Jaafaris. There used to be several for the Sufis in the vicinity of the ka'abah as well.

Having these symbolic structures was a declaration of legitimacy, basically saying that all these expressions of Islam were legitimate. When the Saudis took control of Mecca, they destroyed all of them. They had existed for about 1,200 years. The Al-Saud declared that the reason was that we need not have all these expressions of Islam because Islam is clear and is one.

Furthermore, they destroyed 90 per cent of the historical sites that existed in Mecca and Medina. These provided Islam's history that could be explored, studied and investigated - ideologically and anthropologically. This way the story of the Islamic experience would most likely become a very sophisticated one.

It was all wiped out, so that Islam became a religion without a history, (apart from) the highly idealised time of the Prophet and his companions. But even (their) historical sites were destroyed - denying Muslims and scientists the chance to pose even basic questions about the pluralistic faith.

.Q. Is there something in Arab cultures, say tribalism, that is somehow related to extremist interpretations of Islam?

A. There is a tribal element, but a slightly different (and more important issue) is the Bedouin element. Tribalism has existed in most of the world. You look at a country like England. Until the Romans left, it was a fairly tribal society, as was France, as was even Venice. But that was not necessarily an obstruction to the development of humanistic ideas and human values.

But Bedouinism, as opposed to tribalism, is the existence of a system of allegiance to a family or tribe in an environment that is arid and rather uncomplicated, compared to the urban centres, and in which either someone was your friend or your enemy. You existed in a state of all-out war, and there was a presumption that someone was out to get you until proven otherwise. You needed a military-type structure that needed a leader who could not be questioned. The environment was often a mentality of black and white or yes and no, not the cultured mentality of the arts and sciences and humanities and of philosophy and contemplation. The Quran itself is quite critical of Bedouin society, and speaks about the immoderate nature of those who remain with a Bedouin mentality.

(In contrast) take countries like Egypt or Syria or Iraq. These were highly developed, cosmopolitan places. You had layers of civilisational experiences that created an appreciation for the product of the intellect and sophisticated thought, and an inability to see things as black and white anymore.

.Q. So how does this manifest itself among today's extremists?

A. It is interesting that in the past few decades, if you look at all the sources of violence, they have all been touched by, or emerged from, Bedouin Islam. What I mean is that they have been touched by the Puritanism of Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab, (the 18th-century founder of Wahhabism). This does not mean that he was the only Puritan. But his ideas were married to Saudi resources, and therefore become an enormous problem.

Such Puritanism is a phenomenon that tends to have no appreciation for history, which tends to see the world in terms of how everyone is out to get you unless they prove otherwise, that devalues women and expects obedience from the flock, which should always obey. If the flock participates, it is through the 'grace' of the leader, who allows it the 'privilege' of expressing an opinion.

This Bedouin mentality also contributes to the radical anti-rationalism (of the extremists). In all the violent movements today, we witness the idea that rationalism is the instrument of the Devil, and is fundamentally evil. You find that all (the leading terrorist ideologues) have been influenced by a black-and-white concept: that all people fall either into the category of good or the category of bad.

.Q. So were there other influences in South-east Asia, both cultural and environmental, which allowed a more tolerant and diverse Islam to emerge and flourish?

A. Of course. I'll give you a simple example. Islam in South-east Asia is full of music. When I visited Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, there were events held in my honour, and singers were invited. Now, it is inconceivable in the Arab world that a Muslim scholar would be celebrated by music. The denial of music is a new thing, and is influenced by Wahhabism, which condemns music because it excites the imagination.

In Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Islam is full of music and beauty and expressions of intoxication for the Divine. In fact, if it hadn't been for the Sufis and their ecstasies and the _expression of it through various means, especially in music and poetry, I doubt very much whether Islam would have spread in that part of the world.

.Q. But there is a growing fear that the harsh 'Bedouin Islam' of Arabia is making inroads in this region, into the more tolerant and relaxed 'Islam of the Tropics'.

A. (When I was in the region last year,) every scholar that I spoke to, every official I spoke to, said their main concern was that they have these groups or organisations that are funded by Saudi Arabia, whose officials come in and say lots of the local practices vis-a-vis women are haram (forbidden), vis-a-vis music, poetry and art are haram.

I'll give two minor examples. In Wahhabi Islam, women may not visit graves. And clapping in appreciation is (considered) haram, or religiously forbidden. All this is unique to Wahhabi Islam. When I was growing up in the Islamic world, people used to laugh at the idea that women must not visit graves, because it is based on an absurd idea that only makes sense in a Bedouin context - that women are emotionally vulnerable. (It was thought by Bedouins that) people of evil character would hang out by the graves and attempt to seduce and entice the women.

To my great dismay, I found that this idea, and the idea that people ought not to clap, was now far more widespread and accepted. Little things like that are micro barometers of what is going on.

.Q. What is going on?

A. Before I came to the region, there was a virtual battle as to whether I should come or not. The Wahhabis got the party that initially invited me to Malaysia to cancel. It was only through the efforts of the fellows in Singapore that someone else was found to invite me, because in Singapore they were outraged.

In Singapore itself, although I did several lectures and met several government officials and found the Minister for Islamic Affairs a very, very decent fellow, at one of the lectures I gave in Arabic - well, the Wahhabi party came to the lecture and they were so remarkably rude and disruptive. They kept slamming books, rolling their eyes, and would not engage me. I repeatedly said: 'If there are some people here who are unhappy I invite them to express what they think is so wrong with what I said.' But not a single one of them spoke. It was a challenge to keep my temper.

If time and opportunity permits, I will review Professor Khaled's book in the near future.

Vatican fed-up with Muslim countries

After backing calls by Muslims for respect during the furor over cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, the Vatican is urging Muslim countries to reciprocate by showing tolerance toward their Christian minorities.

"Enough now with this turning the other cheek. It's our duty to protect ourselves," Monsignor Velasio De Paolis, secretary of the Vatican's supreme court, thundered in the daily La Stampa.

"The West has had relations with the Arab countries for half a century, mostly for oil, and has not been able to get the slightest concession on human rights," he said.

Bishop Rino Fisichella, head of one of the Roman universities that train young priests from around the world, told the daily Corriere della Sera that the Vatican should "drop this diplomatic silence."

More at the Washington Times.

Hamza Yusuf - Changing The Tide

Hamza Yusuf delivered the key note speech at the ICNA "Why Islam?" Symposium on March 18, 2006. Hamza Yusuf addresses the importance of proving that Islam is a beneficial presence in America.

The Quicktime video can be downloaded from here.

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