Greater Israel- minus Gaza

When confronted by angry rabbis who wanted Israel returned to the borders that King David had established in Biblical times, Shimon Peres, one of the negotiators of the Oslo Peace Accords, wryly replied: -"Not everything King David did on the ground and on the roof-tops seems to me to be Jewish or appeals to me."

Since its establishment, Israel has always used land it captured in the Six-Day War to buy peace. This policy has reaped rewards in the form of treaties with two of its closest neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, but has frustrated ultra-nationalists who dream of creating a Biblical and bulbous Israel.

While the militaries of most Arab countries remain inferior to Israel's, the state of war that exists between them and Israel means that Israelis constantly live on heightened alert. Saddam Hussein's incoherent bombing of Tel Aviv during Gulf War I brought home to many the message that Arab dictators would never hesitate in dragging Israel into the region's brawls, just to win some kind of pan-Arab sympathy.

Ariel Sharon came into power with concrete promises of settlement expansion into Gaza and the West Bank, but recent events have left him with little choice but to surrender at least one portion of the Occupied Territories. That this portion is the least fertile and the least economically-viable of the two only means that Israel intends to defend, tooth and nail, its annexation of the West Bank.

Giving up Gaza, however, does not necessarily pander to the Palestinians' own nationalistic designs on the land. The Palestinian issue is simply a nominal result of Israel's long-term considerations. A fringe benefit that might, or might not, give psychological succor to millions of displaced Palestinians. The Palestinian militants' claim that Israel was 'driven out' of Gaza is therefore, eminently laughable.

I say this because the Gaza Plan isn't a new plan; it isn't even Sharon's plan. From as early as December 2003, Ehud Olmert, former mayor of Jerusalem, had warned about Israel losing its Jewish character due to simple demograhics. Even with intensive immigration policies of Jews into Israel, the Israeli-Arab's population growth outstripped the Jewish one. Maintaining a grip on Arab-dominant lands like Gaza would tip the balance even further.

"We dreamt that it will be larger. We dreamt that it will be bigger. We dreamt that it will include all of the important places for us. But, at some point in life, we'll have to make a choice-between a larger state but possibly not Jewish, or a smaller state but Jewish. And, I want to live in a Jewish state."

Israel's increasing recognition of the problem culminated in the Knesset (Jewish parliment) passing a law partially limiting the ability of Palestinian Authority residents to receive Israeli citizenship by marrying Israeli Arabs.

Pressure arrived from another unexpected source. The United States became increasingly impatient with Israel's maneuvers to short-circuit the formation of a contigious Palestinian state, with sovereignity over the air and shipping lanes that Sharon had once warned would not be given up to the Palestinians.

A 2004 study into Israel's falling credibility in the international arena convinced many in the Knesset that Gaza disengagement was the best course to take. It entailed none of the sacrifices, or promised sacrifices that the American-sponsored Road Plan forced them to commit to, yet had the singular effect of strenghtening the argument that Israel, despite Palestinian intransigence, was still big enough to tie Gaza in a ribboned box and present it to the Palestinians.

Ariel Sharon's dreams, as that of many of the so-called defence hawks of the Knesset, is to secure, not Jewish hegemony over the world as some Arab newspapers are wont to allege, but Israel's safe borders.